

STEPHEN W. GEARY (Cal. Bar No. 172875)  
Assistant Utah Attorney General  
SEAN D. REYES  
Utah Attorney General  
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor  
P.O. Box 140856  
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856  
Telephone: (801) 366-0100  
Facsimile: (801) 366-0101  
E-mail: [swgeary@agutah.gov](mailto:swgeary@agutah.gov)

*Attorney for Plaintiffs*

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

**STATE OF ALABAMA  
STATE OF ARKANSAS  
STATE OF FLORIDA  
STATE OF HAWAII  
STATE OF IDAHO  
STATE OF INDIANA  
STATE OF ILLINOIS  
STATE OF IOWA  
STATE OF MARYLAND  
STATE OF MINNESOTA  
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI  
STATE OF MISSOURI  
STATE OF OKLAHOMA  
STATE OF OHIO  
STATE OF UTAH  
STATE OF WASHINGTON  
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA**

Plaintiffs,

v.

**ENDO INTERNATIONAL PLC, and  
ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,**

Defendants.

**COMPLAINT**

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Case No. \_\_\_\_\_

1 COMES NOW, the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,  
2 Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah, Virginia, Washington,  
3 and Wisconsin, by their Attorneys General, and alleges the following:

4 **NATURE OF THE CASE**

5 1. The States, by and through their Attorneys General acting in their official capacities  
6 as the States' chief law enforcement officer, bring this action in their sovereign and law  
7 enforcement capacities against Endo International PLC, and Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc.,  
8 (hereinafter jointly referred to as "Endo"). This action is necessitated by Endo's violations of the  
9 Sherman Act and state antitrust and consumer protection laws by entering into a reverse-payment  
10 agreement (a/k/a pay-for-delay agreement) for the purpose and effect of obstructing generic  
11 competition to Lidoderm (hereinafter "Agreement" or "Lidoderm Agreement"). This  
12 anticompetitive Lidoderm Agreement was between the generic drug divisions of Watson  
13 Laboratories, Inc. (now a subsidiary of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Inc.), Allergan  
14 Finance LLC (f/k/a Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Actavis, Inc.), on the one hand, and the  
15 branded drug company Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., its parent company Endo International plc  
16 (f/k/a/ Endo Health Solutions Inc.) (collectively "Endo"), Endo's patent licensor Teikoku Pharma  
17 USA, Inc., and its parent company Teikoku Seiyaku Co., Ltd. on the other. The Lidoderm  
18 Agreement ensured that Endo would not face generic competition for Lidoderm from Watson  
19 from May 2012 through September 2013 and thereafter, Watson would not face generic  
20 competition from Endo or Teikoku until May 2014. As a result, consumers were forced to pay  
21 hundreds of millions of dollars in supra-competitive prices to fill their prescriptions for Lidoderm  
22 and its AB-rated generic equivalents from at least May 2012 through May 2014.

23 2. The relevant market is the United States market for lidocaine patches (i.e., Lidoderm  
24 and its AB-rated generic equivalents).

25 3. Lidoderm is the brand-name for lidocaine patches, which is a transdermal patch that  
26 is widely used as a local anesthetic to prevent pain and is widely prescribed for relief of pain  
27 associated with post-herpetic neuralgia ("PHN"), a common complication of shingles. According  
28 to the United States Center for Disease Control, about 33% of the US population will develop

1 shingles in their lifetime, and that risk increases after the age of 50. Children also can develop  
2 shingles, but it is less common. Lidoderm is a preferred pain medication for PHN.

3 4. Lidoderm was developed by Hind Health Care (“Hind”) in the 1990s for topical use  
4 associated with shingles. In March 1996, Hind submitted a New Drug Application (“NDA”) for  
5 Lidoderm to the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). After Hind’s Lidoderm  
6 formula was patented in 1998 but before its NDA was approved by the FDA, Hind granted Endo  
7 an exclusive marketing and distribution license to Lidoderm and also transferred full ownership  
8 and responsibility of Lidoderm to Teikoku. In November 1998, Teikoku entered into a supply  
9 and manufacturing agreement with Endo and granted Endo the exclusive right to sell Lidoderm in  
10 the United States. Throughout the relevant time period, Teikoku manufactured all of the  
11 Lidoderm patches that Endo sold in the United States.

12 5. At the time of the Lidoderm Agreement, Lidoderm was Endo’s most important  
13 branded prescription drug product. In 2011, Endo generated more than \$825 million from its  
14 branded Lidoderm patches, comprising 30% of Endo’s total annual revenues. The threat of  
15 generic entry to Lidoderm posed significant financial risks for the company. Endo knew that  
16 generic competition would decimate its Lidoderm sales and that any delay in generic competition  
17 would be highly profitable for Endo, but very costly for consumers.

18 6. Two and a half years before entering into the Lidoderm Agreement with Endo and  
19 Teikoku, Watson had submitted an Abbreviated NDA (“ANDA”) to the FDA for approval of a  
20 generic version of Lidoderm. In January 2010, Watson notified both Endo and Teikoku of its  
21 ANDA. In February 2010, shortly after receiving Watson’s ANDA notice, Endo and Teikoku  
22 sued Watson for patent infringement. Thereafter, Endo acquired three additional Lidoderm  
23 patents and based thereon filed a second suit against Watson in June 2011 for infringement of  
24 those patents.

25 7. As to Endo and Teikoku’s first patent infringement suit, the district court issued a  
26 claims construction ruling on June 27, 2011 adopting Watson’s construction of the Lidoderm  
27 patent at issue. A six-day bench trial ensued in February 2012.

28 8. Thus, by 2012, generic entry appeared imminent and indeed, Watson publicly stated

1 that it was preparing to launch its generic as early as the middle of 2012.

2 9. Upon completion of the trial on Endo and Teikoku's first patent suit, Watson, Endo  
3 and Teikoku all submitted post-trial briefs. But before the district judge entered any substantive  
4 rulings on those briefs, Endo and Teikoku bought off Watson and settled both patent infringement  
5 suits filed against Watson. Their settlement agreement, i.e., the Lidoderm Agreement, was  
6 executed on May 28, 2012.

7 10. Under the terms of the Lidoderm Agreement, Endo paid Watson to not compete with  
8 Endo's lucrative Lidoderm franchise. Thus, as part of the Agreement, the Watson entities agreed  
9 to abandon the patent challenges and forgo entry with a lower-cost generic version of Lidoderm  
10 for more than a year, until September 2013. Endo and Teikoku agreed to make payments to  
11 Watson under the Lidoderm Agreement having two components. First, Endo and Teikoku agreed  
12 to provide Watson Pharma with branded Lidoderm patches "at no cost" from January 2013  
13 through August 2013, which Watson Pharma's wholly-owned distribution subsidiary, Anda, Inc.,  
14 could sell for pure profit. The so-called free branded Lidoderm products are valued at \$96 million  
15 to \$240 million. Second, Endo and Teikoku guaranteed that Watson would receive supra-  
16 competitive profits by being the only seller of generic Lidoderm during at least the first 180  
17 days—and up to the first 7½ months—on the market, i.e., from September 2013 through May  
18 2014. Even though Endo had the legal right and financial incentive to sell an authorized generic  
19 version of Lidoderm as soon as Watson entered with its generic product, Endo agreed to refrain  
20 from competing on generic Lidoderm for up to the first 7½ months of Watson's generic sales.  
21 This "no-AG commitment" was worth hundreds of millions of dollars to Watson. In total, Endo  
22 and Teikoku's payment to the Watson entities was worth at least \$250 million.

23 11. In August 2012, the FDA granted Watson final approval to launch its generic  
24 lidocaine patches. But pursuant to the Lidoderm Agreement, Watson did not launch its generic  
25 Lidoderm product until more than a year later, in September 2013.

26 12. The Defendants' Lidoderm Agreement was designed to and did in fact: (a) delay  
27 and/or preclude the entry of less expensive generic versions of lidocaine patches in the United  
28 States; (b) delay the introduction of an authorized generic lidocaine patch, which otherwise would

1 have appeared on the market at a significantly earlier time; (c) fix, raise, maintain, or stabilize the  
2 prices of lidocaine patches, even after generic entry, (d) allocate 100% of the United States  
3 market of lidocaine patches to Endo and Teikoku for up to 13 months; and (e) allocate 100% of  
4 the United States market of generic lidocaine patches to Watson for up to 7½ months.

5 13. But for the Defendants' unlawful Agreement, at least one generic version of  
6 Lidoderm would have been marketed and sold in the United States in 2012. Not only has the  
7 Defendants' unlawful Agreement harmed and continues to harm the State's general economy by  
8 obstructing generic competition to Lidoderm, it also denied consumers the ability to fulfill their  
9 lidocaine patch needs at significantly lower prices far earlier than they did, instead of being  
10 forced to pay for branded and generic Lidoderm at supra-competitive prices.

11 14. The Defendants' anticompetitive conduct violates Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman  
12 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 as well as state antitrust and consumer protection laws. It is squarely within  
13 the States' sovereign interests to ensure the continued enforcement of the antitrust laws and  
14 prevent antitrust violations in order to secure a competitive marketplace and the economic well-  
15 being of their citizens.

16 15. Anticompetitive agreements such as the Defendants' Lidoderm Agreement lead  
17 consumers, payors and the State to pay, directly or indirectly, monopoly prices for Lidoderm  
18 medications and deny them the lower prices that generic competition provides.

19 16. Since consumer welfare is the ultimate touchstone of state enforcement, the States  
20 therefore seek a permanent injunction order, disgorgement, civil penalties, and any other  
21 equitable relief against the Defendants that this Court deems proper to undo and prevent their  
22 unfair methods of competition in entering into and maintaining anticompetitive agreements such  
23 as the Lidoderm Agreement. As alleged in this complaint, the Defendants have demonstrated,  
24 through their execution and concerted enforcement of the anticompetitive Lidoderm Agreement  
25 and other conduct alleged herein that they remain a serious threat to the States' consumer welfare  
26 and competitive marketplaces.

### 27 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

28 17. This complaint alleges violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. It is filed under,

1 and jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by, Sections 12 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.  
2 §§ 22 and 26. All claims under federal and state laws are based upon a common nucleus of  
3 operative facts, and the entire action commenced by this complaint constitutes a single case that  
4 would ordinarily be tried in one judicial proceeding.

5 18. The Court has jurisdiction over the federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.  
6 The Court has jurisdiction over the state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 under the Court's  
7 supplemental jurisdiction because those claims are so related to the federal claims that they form  
8 part of the same case or controversy.

9 19. Venue is proper in this District under 15 U.S.C. § 22 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because  
10 each Defendant transacts business, committed an illegal or tortious act in this District, is  
11 otherwise subject to the Court's personal jurisdiction with respect to this action, or a substantial  
12 part of the events giving rise to the claims arose in this District.

13 20. The Defendants' activities, as described herein, were within the flow of, were  
14 intended to, and did have a substantial effect on the foreign and interstate commerce of the United  
15 States.

#### 16 **PLAINTIFFS**

17 21. The Plaintiff States are Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,  
18 Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah, Virginia, Washington,  
19 and Wisconsin (hereinafter referred to as "the States" or "Plaintiff States"). The States are  
20 authorized to bring actions such as this to obtain injunctive relief as a remedy for violations of the  
21 Sherman Act. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 26; *Hawaii v. Standard Oil Company of California*, 405 U.S. 251,  
22 266, 92 S.Ct. 885, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972).

23 22. As the states' chief law enforcement officer, the Attorneys General are charged with  
24 enforcing the states' antitrust and consumer protection laws.

#### 25 **DEFENDANTS**

26 23. Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a for-profit Delaware corporation, with its principal place  
27 of business at 1400 Atwater Drive, Malvern, Pennsylvania 19355. Endo Pharmaceuticals is  
28 engaged in the business of, among other things, developing, manufacturing, and marketing branded

1 and generic pharmaceutical products. Endo Pharmaceuticals entered into the anticompetitive  
2 agreement challenged in this complaint. Endo Pharmaceuticals markets and sells Lidoderm  
3 throughout the United States.

4 24. Endo International plc is the parent company to Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. Endo  
5 International is a for-profit Ireland corporation, with its global headquarters at 1<sup>st</sup> Floor, Minerva  
6 House, Simonscourt Road, Ballsbridge, Dublin 4, Ireland, and its U.S. headquarters in Malvern,  
7 Pennsylvania. Endo International had \$2.9 billion in revenue in 2014. At the time of the  
8 anticompetitive agreement challenged in this complaint, Endo Pharmaceuticals Holdings was the  
9 parent of Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., and it was doing business as Endo Health Solutions Inc.  
10 Through a series of name changes, acquisitions, and corporate restructuring, Endo Health Solutions  
11 Inc. is now doing business as Endo International plc.

12 25. Endo Pharmaceuticals and Endo International are collectively referred to herein as  
13 “Endo.”

#### 14 **CO-CONSPIRATORS**

15 26. Teikoku Seiyaku Co., Ltd., is the for-profit parent company of Teikoku Pharma USA.  
16 Teikoku Seiyaku is a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan, having its principal  
17 place of business at 567 Sanbonmatsu, Higashikagawa, Kagawa 769-2695 Japan. Teikoku Seiyaku  
18 is the assignee of U.S. Patent No. 5,827,529 (the “‘529 patent”), which was the subject of a patent  
19 lawsuit filed by Endo and Teikoku against Watson, as alleged in this complaint. Teikoku  
20 manufactures Lidoderm in Japan for commercial sale in the United States exclusively by Endo  
21 under a November 1998 Supply and Manufacturing Agreement with Endo. Endo pays Teikoku  
22 Seiyaku royalties under that agreement, as amended. Teikoku Seiyaku entered into the  
23 anticompetitive agreement challenged in this complaint.

24 27. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc. is a for-profit California corporation, having its principal  
25 place of business at 1718 Ringwood Avenue, San Jose, California 95131. Teikoku Pharma is a  
26 wholly owned subsidiary of Teikoku Seiyaku and is the holder of New Drug Application for  
27 Lidoderm. Teikoku Pharma, through its parent company Teikoku Seiyaku Co., Ltd., is one of the  
28 largest pharmaceutical patch manufacturers in the world. Under the Manufacturing and Supply

1 Agreement with Endo, Teikoku Pharma through its operations in San Jose, California supplies  
2 Endo with the Lidoderm manufactured by Teikoku Seiyaku for commercial sale exclusively by  
3 Endo in the United States. Endo shares its monopoly profits in the branded Lidoderm product  
4 with Teikoku Pharma by paying it certain per-unit acquisition costs under that agreement, as  
5 amended. Teikoku Pharma also entered into the anticompetitive agreement challenged in this  
6 complaint.

7 28. At all relevant times, Endo acted in concert with Teikoku. Endo and Teikoku each  
8 signed the Lidoderm Agreement with Watson and acted in concert with respect to performance of  
9 the Agreement, which refers to Endo and Teikoku collectively in provisions relating to the grant of  
10 patent licenses to Watson, the agreement not to launch a competing authorized generic for 7½  
11 months, and the obligation to deliver free branded Lidoderm product to pay Watson.

12 29. Watson Laboratories, Inc. (“Watson Labs”) is a for-profit Nevada corporation, having  
13 its principal place of business at 575 Chipeta Way, Salt Lake City, Utah 84108. At the time of the  
14 Lidoderm Agreement, Watson Labs was engaged in developing, manufacturing, marketing, and  
15 distributing branded and generic pharmaceutical products as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Watson  
16 Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Through at least late 2011, Watson Labs had its principal place of business  
17 at 132 Business Center Drive, Corona, California 92880. Sometime in late 2011 or early 2012,  
18 Watson Labs moved its headquarters to Morris Corporate Center III, 400 Interpace Parkway,  
19 Parsippany, New Jersey 07054, partially in response to a May 2002 consent decree entered into  
20 with the FDA, which required Watson Labs to ensure that its Corona, California facility complied  
21 with the FDA’s Good Manufacturing Practices (“cGMP”) regulations. Watson Labs signed the  
22 Lidoderm Agreement challenged in this complaint on behalf of the Watson entities. Watson Labs  
23 began operating as a subsidiary of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (“Teva”) in or around July  
24 or August of 2016.

25 30. Allergan Finance LLC (f/k/a Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Actavis Inc.) is a for-  
26 profit Nevada corporation, having its principal place of business at Morris Corporate Center III,  
27 400 Interpace Parkway, Parsippany, New Jersey 07054. At the time of the Lidoderm Agreement,  
28 Allergan Finance LLC was known as Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Watson Pharma”). Watson



1 Pharma was a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business at 311 Bonnie Circle, Corona,  
2 California. Sometime in late 2011, Watson Pharma moved its headquarters to 400 Interpace  
3 Parkway, Parsippany, New Jersey 07054. Watson Pharma was engaged in developing,  
4 manufacturing, marketing, and distributing branded and generic pharmaceutical products, among  
5 other things. The corporate officers of Watson Pharma negotiated the anticompetitive agreement,  
6 including substantial provisions directly benefitting Watson Pharma or its affiliates, and Watson  
7 Pharma's chief legal officer signed the agreement. In this and other ways discussed in this  
8 complaint, Watson Pharma was a direct participant in, and beneficiary of, the unlawful conspiracy  
9 with Endo and Teikoku.

10 31. Allergan plc (f/k/a Actavis plc) is a for-profit Ireland corporation, with its corporate  
11 headquarters at Clonshaugh Business and Technology Park, Coolock, Dublin, D17 E400, Ireland.  
12 Allergan plc was created through an all-stock transaction when Actavis, Inc. purchased Warner  
13 Chilcott plc and effected a corporate inversion to change its domicile to Ireland for tax purposes.  
14 When this occurred in 2012, ownership interests in Actavis, Inc. were transferred to Allergan plc,  
15 and substantially the same management team continued the same business under the newly created  
16 entity. According to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC,") there is no indication that Actavis,  
17 Inc. was provided any consideration as part of this transaction. Although its corporate headquarters  
18 are in Ireland, Allergan plc's operational headquarters are in Parsippany, New Jersey, where  
19 Actavis, Inc. was headquartered prior to the creation of Allergan plc. Most—if not all—of Allergan  
20 plc's management team live in the New York/New Jersey area and work on a day-to-day basis at  
21 the New Jersey location, which Allergan describes in its public filings as the company's  
22 "administrative headquarters." Indeed, Allergan is expanding its footprint in New Jersey to further  
23 consolidate "key functions of our organization into a single location." Allergan plc is the parent  
24 company of Allergan Finance, LLC (formerly Actavis, Inc.). Paul Bisaro, currently Allergan plc's  
25 Executive Chairman, approved the Lidoderm agreement at issue in the action on behalf of the  
26 Watson entities. In recent years, Allergan plc has exercised control over Allergan Finance LLC—  
27 including causing the transfer of many branded and generic pharmaceutical products from Allergan  
28 Finance LLC to other Allergan plc subsidiaries without any known consideration to Allergan

1 Finance LLC—such that Allergan plc and Allergan Finance LLC have a unity of interest. Because  
2 transfers of assets such as this could defeat remediation obtained against Allergan Finance LLC, an  
3 inequitable result would occur if Allergan plc were found to be separate from Allergan Finance  
4 LLC for the purpose of this action.

5 32. Watson Labs, Allergan Finance LLC and Allergan plc are collectively referred to  
6 herein as “Watson” or “Watson entities.” The Watson Defendants are engaged in worldwide  
7 marketing, production and distribution of generic pharmaceuticals products, including in this  
8 judicial district and through its wholly owned wholesaler affiliates including Anda, Inc.

9 33. With respect to all of the conduct alleged in this complaint, at all relevant times the  
10 defendants and co-conspirators acted in concert to (a) delay and/or preclude the entry of less  
11 expensive generic versions of lidocaine patches in the United States; (b) delay the introduction of  
12 an authorized generic lidocaine patch, which otherwise would have appeared on the market at a  
13 significantly earlier time; (c) fix, raise, maintain, or stabilize the prices of lidocaine patches, even  
14 after generic entry, (d) allocate 100% of the United States market of lidocaine patches to Endo and  
15 Teikoku for up to 13 months; and (e) allocate 100% of the United States market of generic lidocaine  
16 patches to Watson for up to 7½ months.

## 17 BACKGROUND

### 18 A. Federal law facilitates approval of generic drugs

19 34. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 301 *et seq.*, as  
20 amended by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the “Hatch-  
21 Waxman Act”) and the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of  
22 2003, 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2) and 355(j) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), establishes procedures designed  
23 to facilitate competition from lower-priced generic drugs, while maintaining incentives for  
24 pharmaceutical companies to invest in developing new drugs.

25 35. A company seeking to market a new pharmaceutical product must file a New Drug  
26 Application (“NDA”) with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) demonstrating the  
27 safety and efficacy of the new product. These NDA-based products generally are referred to as  
28 “brand-name drugs” or “branded drugs.”

1           36. The FDA requires NDA holders to identify any patents that an NDA holder believes  
2 reasonably could be asserted against a generic company that makes, uses, or sells a generic  
3 version of the branded drug. The NDA holder must submit these patents for listing in an FDA  
4 publication entitled *Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations*  
5 (commonly known as the Orange Book) within 30 days of issuance of the patent. 21 C.F.R. §  
6 314.53.

7           37. A company seeking to market a generic version of a branded drug may file an  
8 Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) with the FDA. The generic applicant must  
9 demonstrate that its generic drug is therapeutically equivalent to the brand-name drug that it  
10 references and for which it seeks to be a generic substitute. Upon showing that the generic drug is  
11 therapeutically equivalent to the already-approved branded drug, the generic company may rely  
12 on the studies submitted in connection with the already-approved branded drug’s NDA to  
13 establish that the generic drug is safe and effective. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).

14           38. The FDA assigns a generic drug an “AB” rating if it is therapeutically equivalent to a  
15 brand-name drug. An AB-rated generic drug is the same as a brand-name drug in dosage form,  
16 safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteristics, and intended use. A  
17 generic drug also must contain identical amounts of the same active ingredient(s) as the brand-  
18 name drug, although its inactive ingredients may vary.

19           39. When a brand-name drug is covered by one or more patents listed in the Orange  
20 Book, a company seeking to market a generic version of that drug before the patents expire must  
21 make a “paragraph IV certification” in its ANDA certifying that the patents are invalid,  
22 unenforceable, and/or will not be infringed by the generic drug.

23           40. If a company makes a paragraph IV certification, it must notify the patent holder of  
24 its certification. If the patent holder initiates a patent infringement suit against the company  
25 within 45 days of receiving such notice, the FDA may not grant final approval of the ANDA until  
26 the earliest of: (1) patent expiry; (2) district court resolution of the patent litigation in favor of the  
27 generic company; or (3) the expiration of an automatic 30-month stay.

28           41. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides the first generic company or companies filing an

1 ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification (“first filer”) with a period of protection from  
2 competition with other ANDA filers. This is referred to as the “180-day exclusivity” or “first-filer  
3 exclusivity” period. The Supreme Court observed that the 180-day exclusivity period “can prove  
4 valuable, possibly worth several hundred million dollars” to the first filer.

5 42. A brand drug company can market a generic version of its own branded product at  
6 any time, including during the first filer’s exclusivity period. In that case, no ANDA is necessary  
7 because the brand company already has approval to sell the drug under its NDA. Such generics  
8 commonly are known as “authorized generics.” An authorized generic is chemically identical to  
9 the branded drug, but is sold as a generic product, typically through either the brand company’s  
10 subsidiary or through a third party.

11 43. In the absence of generic competition, a brand drug company typically will not  
12 undercut the profits on its branded drug by introducing a lower-priced authorized generic version  
13 of that drug. When an ANDA filer enters, however, an authorized generic may become attractive  
14 to the NDA holder as a means of maintaining some of the revenue it otherwise would lose to the  
15 generic competitor.

16 **B. State law encourages substitution of AB-rated generic drugs for branded drugs**

17 44. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have drug substitution laws that encourage  
18 and facilitate substitution of lower-cost AB-rated generic drugs for branded drugs. Indeed,  
19 California’s generic drug substitution law encourages and facilitates substitution of lower-cost  
20 AB-rated generic drugs for branded drugs. When a pharmacist fills a prescription written for a  
21 branded drug, California’s substitution law allows the pharmacist to dispense an AB-rated generic  
22 version of the drug instead of the more expensive branded drug, unless a physician directs or the  
23 patient requests otherwise. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 4073; *see also* Cal. Gov. Code §§ 14977-  
24 14980 and 14982; Cal. Labor Code § 4600.1.

25 45. Other states and the District of Columbia also have similar drug substitution laws.  
26 These laws were enacted in part because the pharmaceutical market does not function well. In a  
27 well-functioning market, a consumer selects and pays for a product after evaluating the product’s  
28 price and quality. In the prescription drug market, however, a patient can obtain a prescription

1 drug only if the doctor writes a prescription for that particular drug. The doctor who selects the  
2 drug, however, does not pay for it and generally has little incentive to consider price when  
3 deciding which drug to prescribe. Instead, the patient, or in most cases a third-party payer such as  
4 a public or private health insurer, pays for the drug. But these purchasers have little input over  
5 what drug is actually prescribed.

6 46. State substitution laws are designed to correct this market imperfection by shifting the  
7 drug selection choice from physicians to pharmacists and patients who have greater financial  
8 incentives to make price comparisons.

9 **C. Competition from lower-priced generic drugs saves American consumers**  
10 **billions of dollars a year**

11 47. The Hatch-Waxman Act and state substitution laws have succeeded in facilitating  
12 generic competition and generating large savings for patients, healthcare plans, and federal and  
13 state governments. The first generic competitor's product is typically offered at a 20% to 30%  
14 discount to the branded product. Subsequent generic entry creates greater price competition with  
15 discounts reaching 85% or more off the brand price. According to a 2010 Congressional Budget  
16 Office report, the retail price of a generic is 75% lower, on average, than the retail price of a  
17 brand-name drug. In 2015 alone, the Generic Pharmaceutical Association reported that use of  
18 generic versions of brand-name drugs saved the U.S. healthcare system \$227 billion.

19 48. Because of these price advantages and cost savings, many third-party payers of  
20 prescription drugs (e.g., health insurance plans and Medicaid programs) have adopted policies to  
21 encourage the substitution of AB-rated generic drugs for their branded counterparts. As a result of  
22 these policies and lower prices, many consumers routinely switch from a branded drug to an AB-  
23 rated generic drug upon its introduction. Consequently, AB-rated generic drugs typically capture  
24 over 80% of a branded drug's unit and dollar sales within six months of market entry.

25 49. Consumers also benefit from competition between an authorized generic drug and an  
26 ANDA-based generic drug. Empirical evidence shows that competition from an authorized  
27 generic drug during the first-filer's 180-day exclusivity results, on average, in retail prices that are  
28 4% to 8% lower and wholesale prices that are 7% to 14% lower than prices without authorized

1 generic competition.

2 50. Competition from an authorized generic also typically has a significant financial  
3 impact on the first ANDA entrant. An authorized generic typically takes a significant share of the  
4 first ANDA entrant's generic sales, thereby reducing revenues during its 180-day exclusivity  
5 period by an average of 40% to 52%. Thus, if a brand company agrees to refrain from launching  
6 an authorized generic, it can double the first filer's revenues during the 180-day exclusivity  
7 period. This financial impact is well-known in the pharmaceutical industry.

## 8 ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT

### 9 A. Lidoderm is a highly successful, highly profitable brand-name drug

10 51. Lidocaine is a local anesthetic that prevents pain by blocking the signals at the nerve  
11 endings in the skin. The FDA first approved lidocaine for topical use in the early 1950s and has  
12 subsequently approved various topical lidocaine products for a number of different uses.

13 52. Lidoderm is a transdermal lidocaine patch indicated for relief of pain associated with  
14 post-herpetic neuralgia ("PHN"), a complication of shingles. About 1 in 3 people in the United  
15 States will develop shingles in their lifetime, and that risk increases after the age of 50. About 1  
16 out of 5 people with shingles will get PHN. The risk of PHN increases with age. In a minority of  
17 patients, shingles damages nerve fibers and skin, causing pain that can last for months or even  
18 years. There is no known cure for PHN, but pharmaceutical products may offer temporary relief  
19 from PHN pain.

20 53. Lidoderm is the only topical lidocaine patch indicated for the relief of pain associated  
21 with PHN and the only lidocaine formulation used as a first-line therapy for PHN pain. Unlike  
22 other first-line therapies for this condition (including antiepileptics and tricyclic antidepressants),  
23 Lidoderm is applied topically, resulting in minimal systemic absorption and a low risk of  
24 systemic side effects, drug-drug interactions, and drug-disease interactions. As a result, Lidoderm  
25 can be used as long as necessary, with minimal risk of the user developing a tolerance,  
26 dependence, or addiction. For these reasons, Lidoderm is a preferred therapy for treating PHN.

27 54. Hind developed Lidoderm and submitted NDA 20-612 to the FDA for its approval  
28 on May 31, 1996. In November 1998, while Hind's application was pending, Hind, Endo, and

1 Teikoku entered into a series of agreements related to Lidoderm. Under those agreements, Hind  
2 granted Endo an exclusive license to market and distribute Lidoderm in the United States, as well  
3 as an exclusive license to patents related to Lidoderm. On March 19, 1999, the FDA approved  
4 Hind's Lidoderm NDA and thereafter, Hind transferred full ownership of and responsibility of its  
5 Lidoderm NDA to Teikoku.

6 55. Initially, Hind identified two patents in the Lidoderm NDA: U.S. Patent Nos.  
7 5,411,738 ("the '738 patent") and 5,601,838 ("the '838 patent"). Both the '738 and '838 patents  
8 ("the Hind Patents") expired on May, 2, 2012. After acquiring Lidoderm, Teikoku amended the  
9 NDA by identifying an additional patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,827,529 (the '529 patent), to be listed  
10 in the Orange book for Lidoderm. The '529 patent expired on October 17, 2015.

11 56. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc. owns the Lidoderm NDA, and its Japanese parent,  
12 Teikoku Seiyaku Co., Ltd (collectively with Teikoku Pharma USA) manufactures Lidoderm.  
13 Under the terms of a November 1998 supply and manufacturing licensing agreement between  
14 Endo and Teikoku ("Lidoderm Supply and Manufacturing Agreement"), Endo has the exclusive  
15 right to sell Lidoderm in the United States. Lidoderm patches are manufactured in Japan and  
16 imported into the United States by Teikoku Pharma USA through its operations in San Jose,  
17 California. Endo purchases Lidoderm from Teikoku Pharma USA.

18 57. Endo launched Lidoderm in the United States in September 1999. U.S. sales of  
19 Lidoderm grew substantially over time, from \$22.5 million in 2000 to \$947.7 million in 2012. For  
20 much of this period, Lidoderm was Endo's best-selling product, accounting for up to 65% of the  
21 company's total net revenues.

22 58. In July, 2008, Endo was sued by LecTec Co. for infringing two patents: U.S. Patent  
23 Nos. 5,741,510 ("the '510 patent") and 5,536,263 ("the '263 patent"). Endo settled this litigation  
24 in 2009, paying \$23 million in exchange for exclusive licenses to use the '263' and '510 patents.  
25 One year later, Endo granted Teikoku a sublicense to use the '510 patent, who then submitted it  
26 for listing in the Orange Book for Lidoderm. In May, 2011, Endo purchased from LecTec Co. full  
27 title to the '510, '263 and three other patents. The three other patents were: U.S. Patent No.  
28 6,096,333 (the "'333 patent"); U.S. Patent No. 6,096,334 (the "'334 patent"); and U.S. Patent No.

1 6,361,790 (the “’790 patent”) (collectively with the ’263 and the ’510 patents, “the Rolf patents,”  
2 named for one of the inventors).

3 59. As a unique treatment for relieving PHN pain, Lidoderm has been highly profitable  
4 for Endo. Before the entry of generic versions of Lidoderm, Endo sold branded Lidoderm at  
5 prices far above its costs of obtaining product from Teikoku and any royalties Endo paid relating  
6 to the product without sacrificing unit sales or revenues. Even accounting for other direct  
7 expenses that Endo allocated to selling and marketing Lidoderm, Endo’s profit margin on  
8 Lidoderm net sales was still substantial.

9 60. Endo regularly increased its list price, or wholesale acquisition cost (“WAC”), for  
10 Lidoderm without sacrificing unit sales. Between 2008 and 2013, Endo steadily increased its  
11 Lidoderm WAC from approximately \$169 to more than \$260 per box of 30 patches. Over that  
12 same time period, Endo’s unit sales of Lidoderm in the United States remained fairly consistent,  
13 fluctuating between approximately 1.5 and 2.0 million boxes quarterly. Endo’s ability to  
14 significantly increase WAC yet retain unit sales occurred despite the introduction of other  
15 products approved to relieve pain associated with PHN during the relevant time period.

16 **B. Potential generic competition threatened Endo’s Lidoderm franchise**

17 61. Lidoderm’s financial success drew the attention of several generic competitors. On  
18 November 13, 2009, Watson Labs filed ANDA No. 200-675 seeking approval to market a generic  
19 version of Lidoderm. Watson Labs’ application to the FDA contained a paragraph IV certification  
20 that its generic product did not infringe the 529 patent owned by Teikoku and/or that the ’529  
21 patent was invalid or unenforceable. The ’529 patent does not cover lidocaine, the active  
22 ingredient in Lidoderm, which has been used in medications for more than 50 years. Rather, it  
23 covers only certain lidocaine patch formulations containing specified ingredient quantities.

24 62. As to the remaining patents listed in the Orange Book for Lidoderm at the time of  
25 ANDA filing, Watson Labs filed what is known as a paragraph III certification representing that  
26 it would not sell its generic product in the United States until the Hind patents expired on May 2,  
27 2012. Watson made no certification as to any of the Rolf patents which, as of the time of its  
28 ANDA filing, were not listed in the Orange Book.



1           63. Watson Labs was the first generic company to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV  
2 certification covering the '529 patent. Watson Labs therefore became eligible for first-filer  
3 exclusivity, which could prevent the FDA from approving any other generic versions of  
4 Lidoderm until 180 days after Watson began selling its generic product. By delaying Watson's  
5 entry, Endo could delay all generic Lidoderm entry.

6           64. On or about January 14, 2010, Watson Labs notified Teikoku of its paragraph IV  
7 certification relating to the '529 patent. Under the amended Lidoderm Supply and Manufacturing  
8 Agreement with Teikoku, Endo had the exclusive right to determine whether to sue Watson Labs  
9 for infringement, the right to name Teikoku as a party if necessary for the action, and the right,  
10 with limited exceptions, to control litigation and settlement of any claims. On February 19, 2010,  
11 Endo and Teikoku sued Watson Labs for infringement of the '529 patent in federal district court  
12 in Delaware.

13           65. Because Endo and Teikoku sued Watson Labs within 45 days of its paragraph IV  
14 notification, an automatic 30-month stay was imposed. This stay prevented the FDA from  
15 granting final approval to Watson Labs' ANDA until mid-July 2012, absent an earlier court  
16 finding that the product did not infringe the '529 patent or that the '529 patent was invalid or  
17 unenforceable.

18           66. While the patent litigation was pending, the Watson entities took significant steps to  
19 be ready to launch as soon as the FDA approved the Watson ANDA for generic Lidoderm  
20 product, including spending more than \$40 million on a Salt Lake City manufacturing plant  
21 where Watson would manufacture the generic patches and purchasing millions of dollars of raw  
22 materials needed for the patches. In addition, the Watson entities projected revenues from generic  
23 lidocaine patch sales in forecasts and budgets for the period beginning in late 2012 or early 2013.

24           67. Launching Watson's generic Lidoderm product upon FDA approval would likely  
25 require an at-risk launch. In addressing that possibility for generic Lidoderm, Watson Pharma's  
26 CEO, Paul Bisaro, publicly stated that Watson has "never been shy" about launching at risk and  
27 that these launch preparations were not a "bluff," but a genuine commitment to launch a generic  
28 Lidoderm product upon FDA approval, even if the patent litigation had not yet concluded:

1 Just for the record and this is an important point, to demonstrate our commitment to  
2 this product we've built onto our facility in Salt Lake. We spent \$40 million and  
3 we're buying raw material today [February 2012], so we're spending millions of  
4 dollars preparing for this launch. So this is not a bluff; it's true.

5 68. Endo was closely monitoring the steps Watson was taking to prepare for a generic  
6 lidocaine patch launch and Watson's public statements about the likelihood of such a launch.  
7 Endo expected that competition from a generic product would lead to rapid and dramatic declines  
8 in the company's Lidoderm revenues. During the first year after generic entry, Endo predicted  
9 that its branded Lidoderm revenues would decrease by at least \$500 million. Watson similarly  
10 forecasted a sharp decline in branded Lidoderm sales after a generic product entered the market.

11 69. On June 27, 2011, the district court issued a claims construction ruling in which it  
12 adopted Watson's construction of the terms of the '529 patent. As the Patent Case Management  
13 Judicial Guide notes: "The construction of patent claims plays a critical role in nearly every  
14 patent case. It is central to evaluation of infringement and validity, and can affect or determine the  
15 outcome of other significant issues such as unenforceability, enablement, and remedies."

16 70. Shortly after the adverse claim construction decision, Endo filed a separate federal  
17 court action against Watson Labs alleging that its generic product infringed three additional  
18 patents that Endo had subsequently acquired—the '510 patent the '333 patent, and the '334  
19 patent. Of these three patents, Endo listed only the '510 patent in the Orange Book. No 30-month  
20 stay resulted from this later patent litigation.

21 71. A six-day trial on the '529 patent infringement claims occurred in February 2012.  
22 Coming out of that trial, Watson was confident in its litigation position.

23 72. After the trial concluded, the parties submitted post-trial briefs. Before the district  
24 court entered any substantive post-trial rulings, Endo, Teikoku and Watson filed a joint  
25 stipulation on June 1, 2012 announcing that they had settled the '529 litigation and requested  
26 dismissal of the action without prejudice. The district court entered the stipulation on June 13,  
27 2012.  
28

1           **C. Endo and Teikoku paid Watson to abandon its patent challenge and refrain**  
2           **from competing until September 2013**

3           73. On May 28, 2012, Endo, Teikoku, and Watson settled both Lidoderm patent  
4           litigations, entering into the Lidoderm Agreement, before a final decision was issued in either  
5           case. According to Watson, “the principal participants in negotiation of, analysis of, and decision  
6           to enter into the Lidoderm Agreement” were David Buchen (Senior Vice President, Secretary and  
7           General Counsel, Watson Pharma), Paul Bisaro (President and Chief Executive Office, Watson  
8           Pharma), Sigurdur Olafsson (President-Global Generics, Watson Pharma), and Brian Anderson  
9           (Senior Counsel-Intellectual Property, Watson Pharma). Other Watson Pharma executives also  
10          participated in conducting the negotiations, including Watson’s Chief Financial Officer and the  
11          Vice President for Intellectual Property.

12          74. The Lidoderm Agreement required (i) Watson to abandon the patent challenge and  
13          (ii) Watson Pharma and all its subsidiaries to refrain from initiating future patent challenges  
14          relating to Lidoderm or from launching any generic version of Lidoderm for more than a year,  
15          until September 15, 2013. In exchange, Endo and Teikoku agreed to pay the Watson entities  
16          through two separate components. First, Endo and Teikoku committed not to sell an authorized  
17          generic version of Lidoderm for up to 7½ months following Watson’s launch (“No-AG  
18          Payment”). Second, Endo and Teikoku agreed to provide Watson Pharma’s wholly-owned  
19          wholesale distributor, Anda, Inc., with free branded Lidoderm product worth at least \$96 million  
20          in 2013 and the possibility of additional free product worth up to approximately \$240 million  
21          through 2015 (“Free Product Payment”).

22          75. Watson could not have obtained the No-AG Payment or the Free Product Payment  
23          even by prevailing in the patent infringement litigations with Endo and Teikoku.

24                   **1. The No-AG Payment**

25          76. Endo had the legal right and financial incentive to compete with an authorized  
26          generic version of Lidoderm as soon as Watson entered with its generic Lidoderm product. Under  
27          the Lidoderm Agreement, however, Endo agreed not to compete with an authorized generic  
28          version of Lidoderm for 7½ months after September 15, 2013, unless a third party launched a  
29          generic Lidoderm product. In exchange, Watson agreed to pay Endo a 25% royalty on the gross

1 profits from Watson's generic Lidoderm sales before entry of a second generic product. The  
2 parties characterized the No-AG Payment as a "partially exclusive" license.

3 77. The No-AG Payment was extremely valuable to Watson. Because of eligibility for  
4 first-filer exclusivity, the No-AG Payment ensured that Watson would not face generic lidocaine  
5 patch competition for at least 180 days—and up to 7½ months—after its launch.

6 78. A substantial portion of this value from the No-AG Payment directly benefitted  
7 Watson Pharma. When Watson launched generic Lidoderm in September 2013, significant  
8 quantities of Watson's generic product were sold through Anda, Inc., Watson Pharma's wholly-  
9 owned distribution subsidiary. Other Watson affiliates transferred this generic Lidoderm to Anda,  
10 Inc. "at cost," which Anda, Inc. then sold for a substantial profit. But Anda, Inc. did not record  
11 any of these profits in its financials. Instead, all profit was realized by the parent company,  
12 Watson Pharma.

13 79. The No-AG Payment was costly to Endo. Before settlement, Endo had been planning  
14 to launch an authorized generic if Watson launched at risk. Endo estimated that it would earn  
15 \$150 million in authorized generic net revenues during the first year following generic entry.

## 16 2. The Free Product Payment

17 80. As part of the Lidoderm Agreement, Endo and Teikoku also agreed to provide  
18 \$12 million worth of branded Lidoderm product monthly from January through August 2013 to  
19 Watson Pharma through Anda, Inc. "at no cost". The product—worth a total of \$96 million—was  
20 free to Watson: Watson paid Endo and Teikoku nothing for the branded product received under  
21 the Lidoderm Agreement. Endo and Teikoku further agreed to provide up to \$144 million more in  
22 free branded Lidoderm in 2014 and 2015 if the FDA did not approve Watson's generic Lidoderm  
23 application. As stated in the Lidoderm Agreement, Endo and Teikoku provided this free branded  
24 product to Watson as "a good-faith, bargained-for-resolution of the claims at issue in the  
25 Litigation." Even accounting for Teikoku's contributions of \$5 million, Endo's cost of providing  
26 the free branded Lidoderm product to Watson was roughly \$85 million.

27 81. Although the free branded product was provided to Anda, Inc., the true beneficiary  
28 was Watson Pharma. As the head of Anda, Inc. summarized, the proceeds of the Free Product

1 Payment would be “all Actavis [f/k/a/ Watson Pharma] profit” because the free branded product  
2 was “recognized as an Actavis sale” for which Anda, Inc. would realize no profits.

3 82. From at least May 2012 when Endo, Teikoku and Watson entered the Lidoderm  
4 Agreement through September 2013, Endo, Teikoku and Watson agreed to split Endo’s  
5 monopoly profits that branded Lidoderm generated, even though Watson could have released its  
6 generic Lidoderm as early as August 23, 2012 when the FDA approved its Lidoderm ANDA.

7 83. Watson’s sales of Endo and Teikoku’s branded Lidoderm did not increase output,  
8 reduce price, or increase consumer choice; it merely substituted Watson for Endo as the seller of  
9 the branded Lidoderm products that Endo and Teikoku provided to Watson solely to pay Watson  
10 for delaying market entry of its less-expensive generic Lidoderm.

11 **D. Endo and Teikoku’s payment to Watson is large**

12 84. The payment to the Watson entities under the Lidoderm Agreement is large. The total  
13 value of Endo and Teikoku’s expected payment to Watson, including the No-AG Payment and  
14 the Free Product Payment and discounting any royalties Watson paid to Endo, was at least \$250  
15 million.

16 85. Endo’s commitment to refrain from selling an authorized generic for 7½ months and  
17 to forgo the profits from authorized generic sales that it would have made during that period  
18 resulted in hundreds of millions in gain for Watson at a substantial cost to Endo and Teikoku.  
19 Endo and Teikoku’s commitment to refrain from selling an authorized generic would  
20 substantially increase Watson’s expected generic Lidoderm revenues by allowing Watson to  
21 capture all generic Lidoderm sales, instead of splitting these sales with Endo or Teikoku’s  
22 authorized generic. Additionally, as the only seller of generic Lidoderm, Watson could charge up  
23 to 33% more than if it faced competition from an authorized generic. In May 2012—the same  
24 month it entered into the Lidoderm Agreement—Watson prepared several forecasts projecting  
25 Watson’s revenues and profits from generic Lidoderm sales. Based on these forecasts, Watson  
26 could expect to earn at least \$214 million more in generic Lidoderm revenues during its first six  
27 months on the market if it did not face generic competition from an Endo authorized generic.  
28 Extending the effects of the no-AG commitment to the full 7½ months granted under the

1 Lidoderm Agreement increases the value to at least \$260 million.

2 86. The Free Product Payment was worth more than \$90 million in additional  
3 compensation to Watson. Watson anticipated that it would sell the free branded product to  
4 customers at the prevailing market price, which was approximately 4% to 5% lower than the  
5 contemporaneous brand wholesale acquisition cost (commonly referred to as “WAC”). Thus, for  
6 the \$96 million of free branded product that Endo and Teikoku would supply to Watson Pharma  
7 through Anda, Inc. in 2013, Watson Pharma could expect to profit by \$91.2 to \$92 million.  
8 Because Watson Pharma did not have any direct costs for the free branded product, its entire  
9 revenues from those sales were profit.

10 87. Any royalty Watson paid to Endo on Watson’s generic sales would not offset Endo  
11 and Teikoku’s payment to Watson. Based on Watson’s contemporaneous forecasts, its royalty  
12 payments to Endo would only amount to approximately \$101 million, compared to Endo and  
13 Teikoku’s total payment in excess of \$350 million.

14 88. Endo and Teikoku’s payment far exceeds any reasonable measure of avoided  
15 litigation costs in the parties’ underlying patent litigation. The settlement occurred late in the  
16 litigation, after a six-day trial and post-trial briefing. Endo already had spent around \$11.5 million  
17 on the litigation while Teikoku had spent around \$2.3 million. Watson’s litigation spending was  
18 approximately \$6.8 million. Any remaining litigation costs from either Lidoderm patent suit  
19 would be a small fraction of Endo and Teikoku’s total payment.

20 89. Endo and Teikoku’s payment was designed to, and did, induce Watson to abandon  
21 the Lidoderm patent challenge and agree to refrain from marketing its generic Lidoderm product  
22 until September 2013. Watson’s decision to settle was driven not by the strength of Endo and  
23 Teikoku’s patent protection for Lidoderm, but by the large payment Endo and Teikoku made to  
24 Watson.

25 90. Indeed, Endo and Teikoku’s payment exceeded Watson’s litigation expenses in the  
26 parties underlying patent litigation. Moreover, it exceeded the amount Watson projected to earn  
27 by launching its generic version of Lidoderm. Based on internal forecasts prepared around the  
28 time of settlement, Watson would earn at least \$100 million more from the Lidoderm Agreement

1 payment (even accounting for the royalty payments it would make to Endo) than it would earn by  
2 launching generic Lidoderm immediately following FDA approval in 2012.

3 91. Endo and Teikoku were nonetheless willing to make the large payment to Watson  
4 because the September 15, 2013 entry date would ensure that Endo could maintain monopoly  
5 prices for Lidoderm throughout that period.

6 **E. Endo and Teikoku's large payment is not justified**

7 92. Endo and Teikoku's payment to Watson cannot be justified solely as compensation  
8 for services to be performed by Watson. In fact, Watson provided no services to Endo or Teikoku  
9 in exchange for the Lidoderm Agreement payment worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

10 93. Providing \$96 million worth of free branded product to Watson Pharma through its  
11 wholesale distributor did not result in any significant procompetitive benefits. Indeed, Anda, Inc.  
12 sold the free branded product at prices comparable to what customers were paying other  
13 distributors of branded Lidoderm.

14 94. The purpose and effect of Endo and Teikoku's large payment was to induce Watson  
15 to abandon its patent challenge and agree not to compete with a generic version of Lidoderm until  
16 September 15, 2013. Endo and Teikoku's commitment to forgo profitable Lidoderm authorized  
17 generic sales for 7½ months and to provide free branded product worth \$96 million to Watson  
18 make no economic sense independent of securing Watson's agreement not to market a generic  
19 version of Lidoderm until September 15, 2013.

20 95. Likewise, Watson agreed not to compete with its own generic version of Lidoderm  
21 until September 2013 only because Endo shared its Lidoderm monopoly profits in the form of the  
22 No-AG Payment and the Free Product Payment. Without the large payment, Watson would not  
23 have agreed to refrain from competing until September 2013.

24 96. There are no other procompetitive benefits, countervailing efficiencies, or increases in  
25 consumer welfare from the Lidoderm Agreement that outweigh the significant competitive harm  
26 caused by eliminating the risk of Watson's generic entry until September 2013.

27 97. Moreover, Endo and Teikoku's payment to Watson was not reasonably necessary to  
28 achieve any purported procompetitive objective of the Lidoderm Agreement.

## MONOPOLY POWER

### A. Endo's monopoly power concerning Lidoderm

98. Endo exercised monopoly power in the relevant market for lidocaine patches approved by the FDA for sale in the United States, through Watson's delayed entry with a generic version of Lidoderm in September 2013. There is substantial evidence of Endo's monopoly power. Endo and Watson predicted a dramatic decline in the average price of lidocaine patches following generic entry. Additionally, Endo and Watson expected that competition from a generic product would lead to a rapid and dramatic decline in Endo's Lidoderm revenues. For example, Endo predicted that, during the first year after generic entry, its Lidoderm revenues would decrease by at least \$500 million.

99. The data available since the entry of Watson's generic version of Lidoderm confirm the unique competitive impact of such entry on Lidoderm sales and prices. When Watson entered with its generic product, Endo reduced the price of branded Lidoderm as much as 40% in an effort to retain lidocaine patch sales. Nonetheless, within three months, Watson's generic product had captured over 70% of the lidocaine patch unit sales.

100. If Endo already were facing robust competition to Lidoderm, then the entry of generic competition to Lidoderm would not erode the sales volume of branded Lidoderm or the price of lidocaine patches so rapidly and dramatically.

101. In addition, other drugs used to treat PHN have not meaningfully constrained Endo's pricing or sales of Lidoderm. Between 2008 and 2013, Endo steadily increased its Lidoderm WAC from approximately \$169 to \$260 per box of 30 patches. Over that same period, however, Endo's unit sales of Lidoderm in the United States remained largely stable, fluctuating between 1.5 and 2.0 million boxes quarterly. During that same period, the entry of new branded products approved to relieve pain associated with PHN, such as Qutenza, Horizant, and Gralise, had no discernible impact on Lidoderm prices or unit sales.

102. Moreover, because of its unique characteristics, Lidoderm is not reasonably interchangeable with other medications used to relieve pain associated with PHN. Unlike other PHN treatments, Lidoderm is a topical treatment that can be used at home and applied directly to



1 the skin on the affected area. While other drug therapies, such as anticonvulsants and  
2 antidepressants, may be used in conjunction with lidocaine patches to improve results, they are  
3 not viewed by physicians as substitutes. As the head of Endo's Pain Management business  
4 explained: "Lidoderm was unique in the attributes that it presents to a physician and to a patient  
5 as they're seeking a therapy . . . [T]here really is not another product that is exactly like  
6 Lidoderm."

7 103. At all relevant times, Endo, Teikoku and Watson conspired to give Endo monopoly  
8 power in the United States market for branded Lidoderm through September 2013.

9 104. At all relevant times, Endo, Teikoku and Watson conspired to give Endo monopoly  
10 power in the United States market for branded Lidoderm through September 2013.

11 105. Before September 2013, Endo consistently held a 100% share of the relevant market  
12 for branded lidocaine patches.

13 106. Substantial barriers to entry exist in the lidocaine patch market. Potential new  
14 branded drug competitors need to conduct expensive clinical trials and obtain FDA approval.  
15 Potential sellers of generic lidocaine patches also face substantial barriers to entry, including the  
16 need to obtain FDA approval, costly specialized equipment and facilities to manufacture the  
17 patches, and Endo's ability to trigger an automatic 30-month stay of FDA approval by filing a  
18 patent infringement lawsuit.

19 **B. Watson's monopoly power concerning generic lidocaine patches**

20 107. Watson exercised monopoly power in the relevant market of generic lidocaine  
21 patches approved by the FDA for sale in the United States from September 2013 until Endo  
22 began selling an authorized generic in May 2014. While numerous other drugs are used to relieve  
23 pain associated with PHN (including branded Lidoderm), there is substantial evidence of  
24 Watson's monopoly power throughout the relevant time period. Both Endo and Watson predicted  
25 that generic lidocaine patch prices would fall considerably upon entry of the second generic  
26 product, with no corresponding effect on the price of the branded product.

27 108. The data available since the entry of Endo's authorized generic version of Lidoderm  
28 confirm the unique competitive impact of such entry on generic Lidoderm sales and prices. By

1 September 2014, Endo's authorized generic product had captured over 40% of generic lidocaine  
2 patch unit sales, and authorized generic competition had lowered the average price of generic  
3 lidocaine patches by more than 16%. Endo's efforts to discount the branded product had no  
4 comparable effect on generic prices.

5 109. If Watson were already facing robust competition to its generic lidocaine patch, then  
6 the entry of Endo's authorized generic version of Lidoderm would not erode the sales volume of  
7 Watson's generic lidocaine patch or the price of lidocaine patches so rapidly and dramatically.

8 110. In addition, although a branded product is therapeutically equivalent to its generic  
9 counterpart, a unique competitive dynamic exists between generics. Typically, retail pharmacies  
10 stock the branded product plus one generic version. Thus, while the brand company can expect its  
11 product to be available at every pharmacy, generic companies must compete against one another  
12 to be a pharmacy's primary generic supplier. Price is the primary mechanism of such competition.  
13 Consequently, entry of additional generic competitors drives down the average generic price,  
14 often to a fraction of the brand's pre-generic-entry price.

15 111. The initial price offered by the first generic entrant is typically a percentage off the  
16 brand's list price (or WAC). But after the initial generic sales, any correlation between the prices  
17 of the branded product and the generic products generally dissipates. Branded prices often rise  
18 after generic entry as brand companies extract additional profits from those patients who are not  
19 price sensitive and continue to buy the branded product, while generic prices fall as more generic  
20 products come to market. The head of Endo's Pain Management business summarized this  
21 dynamic as follows: "Nobody considers an average price of brand plus generic because they  
22 operate in a different dynamic." Instead, "generic pricing tend[s] to be a function of how many  
23 competitive players are there in the generic market."

24 112. Potential sellers of generic lidocaine patches face substantial barriers to entry,  
25 including obtaining FDA approval, costly specialized equipment and facilities to manufacture the  
26 product, and Endo's ability to trigger an automatic 30-month stay of FDA approval by filing a  
27 patent infringement lawsuit.

28 113. At all relevant times, Endo, Teikoku Watson conspired to give Watson monopoly

1 power in the United States market for generic Lidoderm from at least September 2013 through  
2 May 2014.

3 114. Before May 2014, Watson held a 100% share of the relevant market for generic  
4 lidocaine patches.

### 5 INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE COMMERCE

6 115. At all relevant times, Teikoku manufactured and Endo promoted, distributed, and sold  
7 substantial amounts of Lidoderm products in a continuous and uninterrupted flow of commerce  
8 across state and national lines in the United States. Beginning in September 2013, Watson  
9 manufactured, promoted, distributed, and sold substantial amounts of Lidoderm products in a  
10 continuous and uninterrupted flow of commerce across state and national lines in the United  
11 States.

12 116. At all relevant times, Defendants and Co-conspirators transmitted funds as well as  
13 contracts, invoices and other forms of business communications and transactions in a continuous  
14 and uninterrupted flow of commerce across state and national lines in connection with the sale of  
15 lidocaine patches.

16 117. In furtherance of their efforts to monopolize and restrain competition in the market  
17 for lidocaine patches, Defendants and Co-conspirators employed the United States mails and  
18 interstate and international telephone lines, as well as means of interstate and international travel.  
19 The activities of Defendants and Co-conspirators were within the flow of and have substantially  
20 affected interstate commerce.

21 118. The delay of generic Lidoderm, including Endo and Teikoku's authorized generic  
22 product, has directly impacted and disrupted commerce.

23 119. During the relevant time period, Lidoderm was shipped and sold throughout the  
24 United States, including California.

25 120. Defendants' and Co-conspirators' alleged conduct had substantial effects on intrastate  
26 commerce because Lidoderm was sold to consumers and third-party payors throughout the  
27 country, including California.

28

**HARM TO COMPETITION AND CONSUMER WELFARE**

**A. The Lidoderm Agreement eliminated the risk of generic competition for more than one year**

121. By impeding generic competition, Endo, Teikoku and Watson’s conduct denied consumers and other purchasers of Lidoderm access to AB-rated generic versions of Lidoderm that would offer the same therapeutic benefit as branded Lidoderm, but at a lower price.

122. The agreement between Endo, Teikoku and Watson precluded Watson from launching a generic version of Lidoderm until September 2013 and harmed competition and consumer welfare in California by eliminating the risk that Watson would have marketed its generic version of Lidoderm before September 2013. Through their agreement, Endo and Teikoku eliminated the potential that: (1) Endo or Teikoku would have agreed to settle the patent litigation on terms that did not compensate Watson, but provided for generic entry earlier than September 2013; or (2) Watson would have otherwise launched its generic Lidoderm before September 2013, whether or not patent litigation was still pending.

123. Before the Lidoderm Agreement, Watson was preparing to launch its generic lidocaine patch as early as FDA approval, which it received in August 2012. Watson did not plan to wait until a trial or appeals court decision in patent litigation before launching its generic product. Watson’s generic entry would have quickly and significantly reduced Endo’s market share, promoted economic efficiency, and led to significant price reductions for lidocaine patches. Indeed, when Watson ultimately launched its generic version of Lidoderm in September 2013, Endo immediately responded by providing bigger discounts to retain Lidoderm’s preferred position on certain drug formularies.

124. Watson abandoned its generic entry plans because it received a share of Endo’s monopoly profits in the form of the No-AG Payment and the Free Product Payment. Without the large payment, Watson would have launched its generic version of Lidoderm prior to September 2013.

125. Entry of Watson’s generic product would have given consumers the choice between branded Lidoderm and lower-priced generic substitutes for Lidoderm. Many consumers would

1 have chosen to purchase the lower-priced generic version instead of higher-priced branded  
2 Lidoderm. In its contemporaneous forecasts, Endo predicted its Lidoderm revenues would  
3 decrease by at least \$500 million during the first year after generic entry. As a result of this  
4 generic competition, consumers would have saved hundreds of millions of dollars. By entering  
5 into their anticompetitive agreement, Endo, Teikoku and Watson have shared additional  
6 monopoly profits at the expense of consumers.

7 126. Absent an injunction, civil penalties, disgorgement and other equitable relief, there is  
8 a cognizable danger that Watson will engage in similar violations causing future harm to  
9 competition and consumers. The Watson Defendants knowingly entered into and carried out a  
10 collusive anticompetitive scheme to preserve and share Endo's monopoly profits. Each did so  
11 conscious of the fact that this agreement would greatly enrich them at the expense of consumers.

12 127. Defendants have the incentive, opportunity, and demonstrated interest to continue to  
13 enter other reverse-payment agreements in the future. Endo, Teikoku and Watson each continue  
14 to develop and manufacture pharmaceutical products. Defendants are regularly involved in  
15 multiple patent litigations relating to different drugs. Any of these existing or future patent  
16 litigations provides the incentive and opportunity to enter into another a reverse-payment  
17 agreement.

18 128. In addition, Defendants have the demonstrated interest to continue to enter into such  
19 agreements in the future. According to the FTC, both Endo and Watson have entered into similar  
20 reverse-payment agreements, even after the U.S. Supreme Court's 2013 decision in *FTC v.*  
21 *Actavis*. The FTC further asserts that these agreements include arrangements in which the  
22 payment is in the form of: (1) a business transaction entered at or around the same time as the  
23 patent litigation settlement (serving a similar purpose as the Free Branded Payment); or (2) a no-  
24 AG commitment in which the brand company commits not to sell an authorized generic product  
25 for some period of time.

26 129. Defendants obtained the full benefit of their unlawful agreement concerning  
27 Lidoderm. They did not abandon or disavow the Lidoderm Agreement or any other reverse-  
28 payment agreement following the Supreme Court's decision in *FTC v. Actavis*, which rejected the

1 near automatic immunity for reverse-payment settlements that some courts had erroneously  
2 adopted.

3 **B. The Lidoderm No-AG Payment reduced competition for generic lidocaine**  
4 **patches for 7½ months**

5 130. The Lidoderm Agreement further harmed competition and consumers by eliminating  
6 competition for sales of generic lidocaine patches until May 2014.

7 131. Before the Lidoderm Agreement, Endo and Watson were potential competitors in the  
8 sale of generic lidocaine patches. Indeed, Endo's authorized generic was the only potential  
9 generic competition to Watson's generic lidocaine patch during the 180-day first-filer exclusivity  
10 period for generic Lidoderm. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA was prohibited by law  
11 from approving any other generic version of Lidoderm until the 180-day exclusivity period had  
12 expired or been forfeited. Endo, however, was legally entitled to market an authorized generic  
13 version of its own Lidoderm product at any time, including during the first filer's exclusivity  
14 period.

15 132. Before the Lidoderm Agreement, Endo was planning to launch an authorized generic  
16 as soon as Watson launched its generic lidocaine patch. Under its agreement with Teikoku, Endo  
17 had the exclusive right to sell an authorized generic version of Lidoderm in the United States.  
18 Endo also had the financial incentive to do so. As soon as Watson entered with its generic  
19 product, Endo could sell an authorized generic to compete for sales to generic lidocaine users,  
20 while preserving branded Lidoderm sales for the minority of users who were willing to pay more  
21 for the branded product. Endo estimated that it could make more than \$150 million in net sales  
22 during the first year after generic entry by selling an authorized generic in competition with  
23 Watson.

24 133. Under the Lidoderm Agreement, however, Watson acquired an exclusive field-of-use  
25 license that prevented Endo from launching an authorized generic until May 2014. By eliminating  
26 the potential competition between Endo's authorized generic and Watson's generic version of  
27 Lidoderm, this acquisition substantially reduced competition in the market for generic lidocaine  
28 patches.

1 134. As a result of Endo, Teikoku and Watson's conduct, competition between generic  
2 lidocaine patches was delayed for 7½ months until May 2014. Absent Endo and Teikoku's  
3 commitment not to compete with an authorized generic, Endo or Teikoku would have launched  
4 an authorized generic at or near the time of Watson's generic lidocaine patch entry. Endo's  
5 authorized generic entry would have resulted in significantly lower prices for generic lidocaine  
6 patches and hundreds of millions of dollars in savings for generic lidocaine patch purchasers.  
7 Instead, Endo, Teikoku and Watson shared additional profits at the expense of consumers.

8 135. Upon termination of the exclusive field-of-use license, Endo immediately launched a  
9 Lidoderm authorized generic through its subsidiary, Qualitest. Competition from Endo's  
10 authorized generic product caused the price of generic lidocaine patches to quickly fall by 16% or  
11 more. This significant price reduction is consistent with Endo's and Watson's forecasts as well as  
12 the empirical literature on the price effects of authorized generic competition.

13 136. The partially exclusive nature of Watson's license resulted in no cognizable benefits  
14 to counteract the harm caused by the absence of competition from an authorized generic.

15 137. Endo's commitment not to compete with an authorized generic was not reasonably  
16 related to achieving any cognizable benefits of a larger procompetitive venture.

17 138. Because of barriers such as FDA approval, entry by other firms would not occur to  
18 deter or counteract the competitive effects of eliminating an authorized generic.

19 **VIOLATIONS ALLEGED**

20 **First Claim for Relief**

21 **Count One – All Plaintiff States - Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act**

22 139. Each State hereby incorporates each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though  
23 fully set forth herein.

24 140. Defendants have engaged in an unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy that  
25 has unreasonably restrained trade or commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15  
26 U.S.C. § 1.

27 141. In or about May 2012 and at times prior to the formal execution thereof, Defendants  
28 entered into the Lidoderm Agreement, an unlawful contract, combination or conspiracy to restrain

1 trade that was designed to and did in fact: (a) delay and/or preclude the entry of less expensive  
2 generic versions of lidocaine patches in the United States; (b) delay the introduction of an  
3 authorized generic lidocaine patch, which otherwise would have appeared on the market at a  
4 significantly earlier time; (c) fix, raise, maintain, or stabilize the prices of lidocaine patches, even  
5 after generic entry, (d) allocate 100% of the United States market of lidocaine patches to Endo  
6 and Teikoku for up to 13 months; and (e) allocate 100% of the United States market of generic  
7 lidocaine patches to Watson for up to 7½ months.

8 142. There is and was no legitimate, non-pretextual, procompetitive justification for the  
9 large payment from Endo and Teikoku to Watson that outweighs its harmful effect on  
10 competition. Even if there were some such conceivable justification, the payment was not  
11 necessary to achieve, nor the least restrictive means of achieving, such purpose.

12 143. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' Agreement in restraint of trade, the  
13 States' sovereign and law enforcement interests were harmed.

14 144. The States are therefore entitled to injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants from  
15 engaging in similar conduct in the future and to restore competition in its Lidoderm and AB-rated  
16 generic equivalent markets. The Defendants have demonstrated, through their concerted  
17 enforcement of the anticompetitive agreement challenged in this complaint and other conducted  
18 alleged herein, that they remain a serious threat to competition. The States are also entitled to its  
19 costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees and such other relief as it just and equitable.

20 **Count II – All Plaintiff States - Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2**  
21 **(Conspiracy to Monopolize)**

22 145. The States hereby incorporate each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though  
23 fully set forth herein.

24 146. At all relevant times, Endo possessed substantial market power (*i.e.*, monopoly  
25 power) in the branded Lidoderm market in the United States while Watson possessed substantial  
26 market power in the United States generic Lidoderm market. Endo possessed the power to  
27 control prices in, prevent prices from falling in, and exclude competition from, the branded  
28 Lidoderm market; and Watson possessed the power to control prices in, prevent prices from



1 falling in, and exclude competition from, the generic Lidoderm market.

2 147. Through the Lidoderm Agreement, Endo, Teikoku and Watson conspired to maintain  
3 Endo's monopoly power in the branded Lidoderm market in order to delay market entry of  
4 generic Lidoderm. Endo, Teikoku and Watson conspired to maintain Watson's monopoly power  
5 in the generic Lidoderm market by and through the no-AG provision of their anticompetitive  
6 Agreement.

7 148. The Lidoderm Agreement was designed to and did in fact: (a) delay and/or preclude  
8 the entry of less expensive generic versions of lidocaine patches in the United States; (b) delay  
9 the introduction of an authorized generic lidocaine patch, which otherwise would have appeared  
10 on the market at a significantly earlier time; (c) fix, raise, maintain, or stabilize the prices of  
11 lidocaine patches, even after generic entry, (d) allocate 100% of the United States market of  
12 lidocaine patches to Endo and Teikoku for up to 13 months; and (e) allocate 100% of the United  
13 States market of generic lidocaine patches to Watson for up to 7½ months.

14 149. The goal, purpose and/or effect of the Agreement was to maintain and extend Endo's  
15 monopoly power in the United States market for branded lidocaine patches as well as Watson's  
16 monopoly power in the United States market for generic lidocaine patches, both in violation of  
17 Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. The Lidoderm Agreement was intended to and did  
18 prevent and/or delay generic competition to Lidoderm and enabled Endo and Teikoku to continue  
19 charging supra-competitive prices for Lidoderm without a substantial loss of sales. Likewise, the  
20 Lidoderm Agreement also was intended to and did prevent and/or delay generic competition to  
21 Lidoderm and enabled Watson to charge supra-competitive prices for generic Lidoderm without a  
22 substantial loss of sales.

23 150. Defendants knowingly and intentionally conspired to maintain and enhance Endo's  
24 monopoly power in the United States branded Lidoderm market and also Watson's monopoly  
25 power in the United States generic Lidoderm market.

26 151. Defendants specifically intended that their Agreement would maintain Endo's  
27 monopoly power in the United States market for branded Lidoderm market through September  
28 2013 as well as Watson's monopoly power in the United States market for generic Lidoderm

1 from September 2013 through May 2014.

2 152. Defendants each committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

3 153. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' concerted monopolistic conduct, the  
4 States' sovereign and law enforcement interests were harmed.

5 154. The States are therefore entitled to injunctive relief to enjoin Defendants from  
6 engaging in similar conduct in the future and to restore competition in its Lidoderm and AB-rated  
7 generic equivalent markets. The Defendants have demonstrated, through their concerted  
8 enforcement of the anticompetitive agreement challenged in this complaint, entry of similar  
9 agreements, and other conduct alleged herein, that they remain a serious threat to competition.  
10 The States are also entitled to its costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees and such other  
11 relief as is just and equitable.

12 **Second Claim for Relief**

13 **Violation of State Law**

14 **Count III – Alabama**

15 155. Plaintiff State of Alabama repeats and re-alleges each and every preceding allegation  
16 as if fully set forth herein.

17 156. The acts and practices by Defendants constitute unconscionable acts in violation of  
18 the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Code of Alabama, 1975, § 8-19-5(27) for which the  
19 State of Alabama is entitled to relief.

20 **Count IV - Arkansas**

21 157. Plaintiff State of Arkansas repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained  
22 in paragraphs 1 through 154.

23 158. Defendants' actions violate The Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code  
24 Ann. § 4-88-101 *et seq.*, and Plaintiff State of Arkansas is entitled to relief thereunder.

25 159. Defendants' actions violate the Unfair Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-201 *et*  
26 *seq.*, and Plaintiff State of Arkansas is entitled to relief thereunder.  
27  
28

1 160. Defendants' actions violate Monopolies Generally, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-301 *et*  
2 *seq.*, and Plaintiff State of Arkansas is entitled to relief thereunder.

3 161. Defendants' actions violate the common law of Arkansas and Plaintiff State of  
4 Arkansas is entitled to relief thereunder.

5 162. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101 *et seq.*, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-201 *et seq.*,  
6 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-301 *et seq.*, and the common law of Arkansas, Plaintiff State of Arkansas  
7 seeks and is entitled to injunctive relief, disgorgement, civil penalties, costs, and any other just  
8 and equitable relief which this Court deems appropriate.  
9

10 **Count V – Florida**

11 163. Plaintiff State of Florida repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in  
12 paragraphs I through 154.

13 164. Defendants' acts violate, and Plaintiff State of Florida is entitled to relief under, the  
14 Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, Section 542.15, Florida Statutes, *et seq.*, and the Florida Deceptive  
15 and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Section 501.201, Florida Statutes, *et seq.*

16 **Count VI - Hawaii**

17 165. Plaintiff State of Hawaii repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in  
18 paragraphs I through 154.

19 166. The aforementioned practices by Defendants were and are in violation of Chapter  
20 480, Hawaii Revised Statutes.

21 167. Plaintiff State of Hawaii is entitled to injunctive relief, disgorgement to deprive  
22 defendants of ill-gotten gains unjustly obtained, civil penalties of not less than \$500 nor more  
23 than \$10,000 for each violation pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes section 480-3.1, attorney's  
24 fees together with the costs of suit, and any other remedies available under Chapter 480, Hawaii  
25 Revised Statutes, and any other provision in the Hawaii Revised Statutes.  
26  
27  
28

**Count VII – Idaho**

1  
2 168. Plaintiff State of Idaho repeats and re-alleges each and every preceding allegation as if  
3 fully set forth herein.

4 169. Defendants’ actions as alleged herein violate the Idaho Competition Act, Idaho Code  
5 § 48-104, in that they have the purpose and/or the effect of unreasonably restraining Idaho  
6 commerce, as that term is defined by Idaho Code § 48-103(1).

7 170. Defendants’ actions as alleged herein violate the Idaho Competition Act, Idaho Code  
8 § 48-105, in that they represent monopolization of, or attempts to monopolize, or a conspiracy to  
9 monopolize, a line of Idaho commerce, as that term is defined by Idaho Code § 48-103(1).

10 171. For each and every violation alleged herein, Plaintiff State of Idaho, on behalf of itself,  
11 its state agencies, and persons residing in Idaho, is entitled to all legal and equitable relief available  
12 under the Idaho Competition Act, Idaho Code §§ 48-108, 48-112, including, but not limited to,  
13 injunctive relief, actual damages or restitution, civil penalties, disgorgement, expenses, costs,  
14 attorneys’ fees, and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable.

**Count VIII - Illinois**

15  
16 172. Plaintiff State of Illinois repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in  
17 paragraphs I through 154.

18 173. The Defendants violated section 3 of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILCS 10/3, by  
19 their conduct to prevent generic competition for Lidoderm, with the purpose of raising the price  
20 of lidocaine patches.

21 174. Plaintiff State of Illinois is entitled to an injunction, damages, disgorgement, civil  
22 penalties, costs of suit (including reasonable attorneys’ fees), and any other remedy available at  
23 law and equity for these violations.

**Count IX - Indiana**

24  
25 174. Plaintiff State of Indiana repeats and alleges each and every allegation contained in  
26 paragraphs I through 154.

27 175. The aforementioned practices are in violation of the Indiana Antitrust Act, Ind.  
28

1 Code §24-1-1-1 and §24-1-2-1, the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, LC. § 24-5-0.5-1, and  
2 Indiana common law.

3 **Count X - Iowa**

4 176. Plaintiff State of Iowa repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in  
5 paragraphs I through 154.

6 177. The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation of Iowa Competition  
7 Law, Iowa Code ch. 553.

8 178. Iowa seeks an injunction, divestiture of profits, and actual damages resulting  
9 from these practices pursuant to Iowa Code Section 553.12, and civil penalties pursuant to  
10 Iowa Code Section 553.13.

11 179. Defendants' acts and practices as alleged herein also constitute an unfair  
12 practice in violation of the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, Iowa Code Section 714.16(2)(a).

13 180. Pursuant to Iowa Code Section 714.16(7), the State of Iowa, seeks  
14 disgorgement, restitution, and other equitable relief for these violations. In addition, pursuant to  
15 Iowa Code Section 714.16(11) the Attorney General seeks reasonable fees and costs for the  
16 investigation and court action.

17 **Count XI- Maryland**

18 181. Plaintiff State of Maryland repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained  
19 in paragraphs I through 154.

20 182. The aforementioned practices by Defendants are in violation of the Maryland  
21 Antitrust Act, Md. Commercial Law Code Ann., §11-201 et seq.

22 183. Further, §11-209(a)(3) provides that the court may exercise all equitable powers  
23 necessary to remove the effects of any violation including injunction, restitution, disgorgement and  
24 divestiture. The Plaintiff State of Maryland is entitled to costs, reasonable attorney's fees and civil  
25 penalties. §§11-209(b)(3), 11-209(a)(4).

26 **Count XII - Minnesota**

27 184. Plaintiff State of Minnesota repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained  
28 in paragraphs 1 through 154.

1 185. Defendants' acts violate, and Plaintiff State of Minnesota is entitled to an injunction,  
2 disgorgement, civil penalties, costs of suit (including reasonable attorneys' fees), and any other  
3 remedy available at law for these violations under the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, Minn.  
4 Stat. §§ 325D.43-.66, the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act of 1973, Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.43-  
5 .48, Minn. Stat. § 325F.71, Minn. Stat. Ch. 8, and Minnesota common law for unjust enrichment.

6 **Count XIII – Mississippi**

7 186. Plaintiff State of Mississippi repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained  
8 in paragraphs I through 154.

9 187. The aforementioned practices by Defendants were in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §  
10 75- 21-1 *et seq.* and Miss. Code Ann. §75- 24-1 *et seq.*

11 188. Plaintiff State of Mississippi is entitled to an injunction, disgorgement, civil penalties,  
12 costs of suit (including reasonable attorneys' fees), and any other remedy available at law and  
13 equity for these violations.

14 **Count XIV - Missouri**

15 189. Plaintiff State of Missouri, by and through its Attorney General, repeats and re-  
16 alleges paragraphs 1 through 154 as if fully set forth herein.

17 190. The aforementioned practices by Defendants violate the Missouri Antitrust Law,  
18 Missouri Rev. Stat. §§ 416.011 *et seq.*, and Missouri's Merchandising Practices Act, Missouri  
19 Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010 *et seq.*, as further interpreted by 15 CSR 60-8.010 *et seq.* and 15 CSR 60-  
20 9.01 *et seq.*, and the Office of the Missouri Attorney General is entitled to an injunction,  
21 disgorgement, and order of restitution, civil penalties, and any other relief available under the  
22 aforementioned Missouri statutes and regulations.

23 191. The Office of the Missouri Attorney General also seeks its costs and attorney fees  
24 incurred in the prosecution of this action.

25 **Count XV - Ohio**

26 192. 192. Plaintiff State of Ohio repeats and re-alleges each and every  
27 allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 154 as if fully set forth herein.

28



1 and Utah common law, including, without limitation, damages (including treble damages, where  
2 permitted), injunctive relief, including disgorgement, restitution, unjust enrichment, and other  
3 equitable monetary relief, civil penalties, and its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

4 203. The aforementioned acts by Defendants violate the Utah Consumer Sales Practices  
5 Act, Utah Code §§ 13-11-1 through 13-11-23 (the "CSPA"). Accordingly, Plaintiff State of Utah,  
6 Division of Consumer Protection, is entitled to relief under the CSPA, including, without limitation,  
7 injunctive relief, civil penalties, costs, including costs of investigation, and reasonable attorneys'  
8 fees.

9 **Count XVIII- Virginia**

10 204. Plaintiff Commonwealth of Virginia repeats and re-alleges each and every  
11 allegation contained in paragraphs I through 154 as if fully set forth herein.

12 205. The aforementioned practices by Defendants are in violation of the Virginia  
13 Antitrust Act, Virginia Code Sections 59.1-9.1, *et seq.* These violations substantially affect the  
14 people of Virginia and have impacts within the Commonwealth of Virginia.

15 206. Plaintiff Commonwealth of Virginia, through the Attorney General, brings this  
16 action pursuant to Section 59.1-9.15 of the Virginia Antitrust Act, Va. Code § 59.1-9.15.

17 207. Pursuant to Sections 59.1-9.15(a) and (d), Plaintiff Commonwealth of Virginia  
18 seeks disgorgement, restitution, and other equitable relief, as well as civil penalties for these  
19 violations. In addition, pursuant to Section 59.1-9.15(b), the Plaintiff Commonwealth of Virginia  
20 seeks reasonable fees and costs for the investigation and litigation.

21 **Count XIX - Washington**

22 208. Plaintiff State of Washington repeats and realleges each and every allegation  
23 contained in paragraphs I through 154.

24 209. The aforementioned practices by Defendant were, and are in, violation of the  
25 Washington Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Rev. Code 19.86 *et seq.* These violations had  
26 impacts within the State of Washington and substantially affected the people of Washington.

27 210. Plaintiff State of Washington seeks damages, restitution, disgorgement, injunctions,  
28 civil penalties, and its costs and attorney's fees under state law, Wash. Rev. Code 19.86 *et seq.*



**Count XX - Wisconsin**

1  
2 211. Plaintiff State of Wisconsin repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation  
3 contained in paragraphs 1 through 154.

4 212. The aforementioned practices by Defendant are in violation of Wisconsin's Antitrust  
5 Act, Wis. Stat. § 133.03 *et seq.* These violations substantially affect the people of Wisconsin and  
6 have impacts within the State of Wisconsin.

7 213. Plaintiff State of Wisconsin, under its antitrust enforcement authority in Wis. Stat. ch.  
8 133, is entitled to an injunction, disgorgement, and civil penalties and any other remedy available  
9 at law for these violations under Wis. Stats. §§ 133.03, 133.14, 133.16, 133.17, and 133.18.

10 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

11 The States request that:

12 (A) the Court adjudge and decree that the Lidoderm Agreement constitutes an illegal restraint  
13 of interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act;

14 (B) the Court adjudge and decree that the Defendants' concerted monopolistic conduct, as  
15 alleged herein, constitutes a conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman  
16 Act;

17 (C) the Court adjudge and decree that the Lidoderm Agreement constitutes an illegal restraint  
18 of trade in violation of the aforementioned state laws;

19 (D) that Defendants be permanently enjoined and restrained from committing any acts in  
20 violation of state or federal antitrust laws, such as the wrongful acts alleged herein;

21 (E) that Defendants be disgorged of the ill-gotten gains they had obtained as a result of their  
22 acts;

23 (F) that the Court make such orders or judgments as may be necessary to prevent the use or  
24 employment by Defendants of any act or practice that constitutes unfair competition or as may be  
25 necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property that may have been acquired  
26 by means of such unfair competition;

27 (G) that the Court assess civil penalties per each State's law;

28

1 (H) that Plaintiffs be awarded such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper to redress  
2 and prevent recurrence of the alleged violations and to dissipate the anticompetitive effects of the  
3 illegal agreement entered into by Defendants; and

4 (I) that Plaintiffs be awarded the costs of this action and reasonable attorneys' fees, including  
5 costs of investigation.

6 **JURY TRIAL DEMAND**

7 Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demands a trial by  
8 jury for all issues so triable.

9 Dated: July 19, 2019


10 Respectfully submitted,

11 SEAN D. REYES  
Utah Attorney General

12 /s/ Stephen W. Geary  
13 STEPHEN W. GEARY  
14 Assistant Utah Attorney General  
Attorney for Plaintiffs

STEVE MARSHALL  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF ALABAMA

By: 

BILLINGTON M. GARRETT

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

501 Washington Avenue

Montgomery, Alabama 36130

(334) 242-7248

(334) 242-2433 (Fax)

[bgarrett@ago.state.al.us](mailto:bgarrett@ago.state.al.us)

FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF ARKANSAS  
LESLIE RUTLEDGE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:   
Johnathan R. Carter, Ark Bar No. 2007105  
Assistant Attorney General  
Arkansas Attorney General's Office  
323 Center Street, Suite 200  
Little Rock, AR 72201  
(501) 682-8063  
Johnathan.carter@arkansasag.gov


ASHLEY MOODY  
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
STATE OF FLORIDA

By: Lee Istrail

Lee Istrail, FLBN 119216  
Assistant Attorney General  
Antitrust Division  
Office of the Attorney General of Florida  
The Capitol  
PL-01  
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050  
Tel: 850-414-3841  
Fax: 850-488-9134  
E-mail: lee.istrail@myfloridalegal.com

FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF HAWAI'I


CLARE E. CONNORS  
ATTORNEY GENERAL



Bryan C. Yee  
Rodney I. Kimura  
Deputy Attorneys General  
Department of the Attorney General  
425 Queen Street  
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96813  
Phone: 808-586-1180  
Fax: 808-586-1205  
[Rodney.i.kimura@hawaii.gov](mailto:Rodney.i.kimura@hawaii.gov)

*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Hawai'i*

STATE OF IDAHO  
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "John K. Olson". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "J".

---

Brett T. DeLange

John K. Olson

Deputy Attorneys General

Consumer Protection Division

Office of the Attorney General

954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor

P.O. Box 83720

Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Telephone: (208) 334-4114

Fax: (208) 334-4151

[brett.delange@ag.idaho.gov](mailto:brett.delange@ag.idaho.gov)

[john.olson@ag.idaho.gov](mailto:john.olson@ag.idaho.gov)

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS  
KWAME RAOUL  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS

By Angelina Whitfield  
Angelina M. Whitfield,  
AAG, Antitrust Bureau  
Illinois State Bar No. 99000

*Attorney for the State of Illinois*


Office of the Illinois Attorney General  
100 W. Randolph Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60601  
Phone: 312-814-8254  
Fax: 312-814-4209  
Email: [awhitfield@atg.state.il.us](mailto:awhitfield@atg.state.il.us)



FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF INDIANA


CURTIS T. HILL, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL  
STATE OF INDIANA

By:



Amanda Jane Gallagher  
Deputy Attorney General  
Office of the Indiana Attorney General Curtis Hill  
302 West Washington St., 5th Floor  
IGCS -5th Floor  
Indianapolis, IN 46204

THOMAS J. MILLER  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IOWA


By: 

Max M. Miller  
Consumer Protection Division  
Office of the Iowa Attorney General  
1305 E. Walnut St.  
Des Moines, IA 50319  
Telephone: (515) 281-5926  
Fax: (515) 281-6771  
Max.Miller@ag.iowa.gov

BRIAN E. FROSH  
Attorney General of Maryland


John R. Tennis  
Chief, Antitrust Division

By:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gary Honick", is written over a solid horizontal line.

Gary Honick  
Senior Assistant Attorney General  
Office of the Maryland Attorney General  
Antitrust Division  
200 St. Paul Place, 19<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Baltimore, Maryland 21202  
Tel: (410) 576-6470  
Fax: (410) 576-7830  
[ghonick@ong.state.md.us](mailto:ghonick@ong.state.md.us)

KEITH ELLISON  
Attorney General  
State of Minnesota

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. Meyer', is written over a horizontal line.

JOSEPH C. MEYER  
Assistant Attorney General  
Atty. Reg. No. 0396814

445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1400  
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2131  
(651) 757-1433 (Voice)  
(651) 296-9663 (Fax)  
[joseph.meyer@ag.state.mn.us](mailto:joseph.meyer@ag.state.mn.us)

ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF MINNESOTA

FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL  
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

By: 

Crystal Utley Secoy  
Consumer Protection Division  
Mississippi Attorney General's Office  
Post Office Box 22947  
Jackson, Mississippi 39225  
Telephone: 601-359-4213  
Fax: 601-359-4231  
cutle@ago.state.ms.us

**ERIC S. SCHMITT**  
Attorney General

By:  \_\_\_\_\_

Michael Schwalbert  
Assistant Attorney General  
Consumer Protection Section  
Missouri Attorney General's Office  
815 Olive Street | Suite 200  
Saint Louis, Missouri 63101  
michael.schwalbert@ago.mo.gov  
Phone: 314-340-7888  
Fax: 314-340-7957


DAVE YOST  
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
STATE OF OHIO

By:  \_\_\_\_\_

Sara E. Coulter, OSB No. 96793  
Assistant Attorney General  
Ohio Attorney General's Office  
Antitrust Section  
150 E. Gay St, 22nd Floor  
Columbus, OH 43215  
Telephone: 614-466-4328  
Fax: 614-995-0266  
Sara.Coulter@ohioattorneygeneral.gov

Respectfully submitted,

MIKE HUNTER  
Attorney General of Oklahoma

By: 

CALEB SMITH, OBA No. 33613  
Assistant Attorney General  
Office of the Oklahoma Attorney General  
313 NE 21st Street  
Oklahoma City, OK 73105  
Phone: (405) 522-1014  
Fax: (405) 522-0085



FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF UTAH

SEAN D. REYES, ATTORNEY GENERAL  
STATE OF UTAH

By: 

\_\_\_\_\_  
Tara Pincock, Assistant Attorney General  
Office of Attorney General of Utah  
Tax, Financial Services and Antitrust Division  
160 East 300 South, 5<sup>th</sup> Floor  
P.O. Box 140874  
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0874  
Tel: 801-244-4636  
[tpincock@agutah.gov](mailto:tpincock@agutah.gov)


FOR PLAINTIFF COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

MARK R. HERRING, ATTORNEY GENERAL  
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

By: *Sarah Oxenham Allen*

Sarah Oxenham Allen  
Antitrust Unit  
Virginia Attorney General's Office  
202 North 9<sup>th</sup> Street  
Richmond, VA 23219  
Telephone: (804) 786-6557  
Fax: (804) 786-1022  
[soallen@oag.state.va.us](mailto:soallen@oag.state.va.us)

STATE OF WASHINGTON  
ROBERT W. FERGUSON  
Attorney General

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Justin Wade". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above a horizontal line.

---

JUSTIN WADE  
Assistant Attorney General  
Washington State Bar No. 41168

Attorneys for the State of Washington

Antitrust Division  
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000  
Seattle, WA 98104  
206.464.7030  
Justin.Wade@atg.wa.gov

JOSHUA L. KAUL  
Attorney General of Wisconsin



LAURA E. MCFARLANE

Assistant Attorney General  
WI State Bar No. 1089358

Wisconsin Department of Justice  
Post Office Box 7857  
Madison, Wisconsin 53707-7857  
(608) 266-8911  
(608) 266-2250 (Fax)  
mcfarlanele@doj.state.wi.us

Attorneys for the State of Wisconsin