

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

1 RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A  
2 SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY  
3 FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.  
4 WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY  
5 MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE  
6 NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A  
7 COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

8 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at  
9 the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,  
10 on the 17<sup>th</sup> day of February, two thousand sixteen.

11  
12 PRESENT:

13 PIERRE N. LEVAL,  
14 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,  
15 SUSAN L. CARNEY,  
16 *Circuit Judges.*

17  
18  
19 IN RE: ELECTRONIC BOOKS ANTITRUST LITIGATION\*

20  
21 Nos. 14-4649(L),  
22 14-4710(Con)  
23

24  
25 FOR OBJECTOR-APPELLANT JOHN  
26 BRADLEY:

STEVE A. MILLER, Denver, CO.

27  
28 FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES STATE  
29 OF ARIZONA, THE STATE OF  
30 ALASKA, THE STATE OF ARKANSAS,  
31 STATE OF COLORADO, THE STATE  
32 OF DELAWARE, THE DISTRICT OF  
33 COLUMBIA, STATE OF IDAHO,  
34 STATE OF INDIANA, THE STATE  
35 OF KANSAS, STATE OF LOUISIANA,

GARY M. BECKER, Assistant Attorney  
General, *for* George Jepsen, Attorney  
General of Connecticut; (Charles E. Roy,  
First Assistant Attorney General; Eric  
Lipman, Assistant Attorney General;  
James E. Davis, Deputy Attorney General;  
Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General; J.  
Campbell Barker, Deputy Solicitor

\* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption in this case to conform to the caption above.

1 STATE OF MARYLAND, THE  
2 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,  
3 STATE OF MICHIGAN, STATE OF  
4 MISSOURI, THE STATE OF NEBRASKA,  
5 THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, THE  
6 STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, STATE OF  
7 CALIFORNIA, STATE OF WISCONSIN,  
8 THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,  
9 STATE OF TEXAS, STATE OF ILLINOIS,  
10 STATE OF IOWA, STATE OF VERMONT,  
11 STATE OF TENNESSEE, STATE OF  
12 SOUTH DAKOTA, COMMONWEALTH  
13 OF PUERTO RICO, COMMONWEALTH  
14 OF PENNSYLVANIA, STATE OF OHIO,  
15 STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, STATE OF  
16 CONNECTICUT, THE STATE OF  
17 ALABAMA, STATE OF NEW YORK, THE  
18 STATE OF UTAH:

19  
20 FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES SHILPA  
21 GROVER, FREDRIC A. PRESS,  
22 ANTHONY PETRU, JEFFREY EVANS,  
23 ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL  
24 OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,  
25 CLARISSA WEISS, ON BEHALF OF  
26 HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS  
27 SIMILARLY SITUATED, RHONDA  
28 BURSTEIN, JUAN SOTOMAYOR,  
29 ROBERT CHEATHAM, JOHN T. MEYER,  
30 ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL  
31 OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PAUL  
32 MEYER, PAUL J. MEYER, ON BEHALF  
33 OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,  
34 LIANA LINGOFELT, MARCIA GREENE,  
35 ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL  
36 OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, AUBRIE  
37 ANN JONES, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES  
38 AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,  
39 DAVID YASTRAB, ON BEHALF OF  
40 HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY  
41 SITUATED, CYRUS JOUBIN, ON BEHALF  
42 OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS  
43 SIMILARLY SITUATED, BRIAN BROWN,  
44 ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL

General, *for* Ken Paxton, Attorney General  
of Texas, *on the brief*); (Andrew W. Amend,  
Assistant Solicitor General, *for* Eric T.  
Schneiderman, Attorney General of New  
York, *on the brief*).

STEVE W. BERMAN (Jeff D. Friedman,  
Shana Scarlett, *on the brief*), Hagens Berman  
Sobol Shapiro LLP, Seattle, WA, Berkeley,  
CA; (Kit A. Pierson, Jeffrey Dubner,  
Douglas Richards, *on the brief*, Cohen  
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, New York,  
NY, Washington, D.C.).

1 OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,  
2 HARRISON GOLDMAN, ON BEHALF  
3 OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS  
4 SIMILARLY SITUATED, KEVIN  
5 RADER-RHODENBAUGH, BRIAN MCGEE,  
6 ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL  
7 OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, CAROL  
8 NESS, KATRINA KEY, PATSY DIAMOND,  
9 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL  
10 OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, MARCUS  
11 MATHIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON  
12 BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY  
13 SITUATED, EUGENIA RUANE-GONZALES,  
14 STEVEN RIVERS, CHRISTIAN GILSTRAP,  
15 CYNTHIA J. TYLER, THOMAS FRIEDMAN,  
16 JEREMY SHEPPECK, ALOYSIUS J. BROWN, III,  
17 ANNE M. RINALDI, LAURA J. WARNER,  
18 BARBARA HEATH, KATHLEEN LINDA  
19 PITLOCK, KATHLEEN WEISS,  
20 MATTHEW A. HOSKING, DIANE  
21 URBANEC, ED MACAULEY, RONNA  
22 HAMELIN, JAMES L. NESMITH, LAUREN  
23 ALBERT, SUE ROBERTS, SUE ELLEN  
24 GORDON, SHANE S. DAVIS, STEVEN  
25 D. CAMPBELL, CHARLES LEONARD  
26 PELTON, SR., KIMBERLY WHITESIDE  
27 BROOKS, JESSICA MOYER, ANDREAS  
28 ALBECK, REBECCA L. ROSSMAN,  
29 MIRIAM CUMMINGS, CAROLE C. KEHL,  
30 KAMAL SONTI, GRETCHEN ULBEE, CHAD  
31 MILLER, ELVIRA MONZON, SUSAN  
32 HOROWITZ, AMY D. NOLAN, ON BEHALF  
33 OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS  
34 SIMILARLY SITUATED, GRACE HOKE:  
35

1  
2 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District  
3 of New York (Cote, J.).

4 **UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,**  
5 **ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** that the judgment entered by the District Court on  
6 November 21, 2014, is **AFFIRMED**.

7 After a bench trial, the District Court determined that Apple Inc. (“Apple”)   
8 conspired to raise the prices of electronic books (“ebooks”) in violation of state and federal   
9 antitrust laws. *See United States v. Apple Inc.*, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (the   
10 “Liability Finding”). Apple appealed this determination. *See United States v. Apple, Inc.*, 791   
11 F.3d 290, 339 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming the District Court’s Liability Finding), *pet. for cert.*   
12 *docketed*, No. 15-565 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2015) (the “Liability Appeal”). Approximately five weeks   
13 before the scheduled start of a trial on damages—while the Liability Appeal was still pending   
14 before a panel of our Court—Apple entered into a class action settlement (the “Settlement”)   
15 resolving claims for damages stemming from the Liability Finding brought on behalf of   
16 consumers of ebooks. The District Court approved the Settlement. In this appeal,   
17 Objector-Appellant John Bradley challenges the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of   
18 the Settlement.<sup>1</sup> We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the   
19 procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to   
20 affirm.

21 The payments Apple agreed to make under the Settlement depend on the outcome of   
22 the Liability Appeal. If the Liability Finding is affirmed, the Settlement calls for Apple to   
23 pay \$400 million in damages to consumers, plus a total of \$50 million in attorneys’ fees and   
24 costs to the private plaintiffs and the states that brought suit as *parens patriae* (together,   
25 “Plaintiffs”). If the Liability Finding is remanded for further proceedings after either vacatur   
26 or reversal, the Settlement requires Apple to pay far less: \$50 million to consumers, and \$20

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<sup>1</sup> Objector Dianne Young Erwin also appealed the District Court’s approval of the Settlement, but has voluntarily dismissed her appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). *See* Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss, No. 14-4649, ECF No. 117 (July 30, 2015). Her claims are therefore not addressed in this order.

1 million in fees and costs to Plaintiffs. If the Liability Finding is reversed without providing  
2 for the possibility of a Plaintiffs' victory, the Settlement provides that Apple will make no  
3 payments to consumers or for attorneys' fees or costs, and Plaintiffs will move to dismiss  
4 their claims against Apple with prejudice.

5 Our Court has now affirmed the Liability Finding, and Apple did not move to rehear  
6 *en banc*. The Liability Finding will stand unless the Supreme Court grants Apple's pending  
7 *certiorari* petition and rejects our judgment.

8 A district court may approve a class action settlement only if the settlement is "fair,  
9 reasonable, and adequate." Fed R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). In this Circuit, district courts examine  
10 the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a class settlement according to the *Grinnell*  
11 factors—considerations that we enunciated in *City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448 (2d  
12 Cir. 1974), *abrogated on unrelated grounds by Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc.*, 209 F.3d 43, 49–  
13 50 (2d Cir. 2000). The *Grinnell* factors are:

14  
15 (1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the  
16 reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings  
17 and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing  
18 liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of  
19 maintaining the class action through the trial; (7) the ability of the  
20 defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of  
21 reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible  
22 recovery; (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a  
23 possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.

24  
25 *Id.* at 463 (citations omitted). We review for abuse of discretion a district court's  
26 determination, pursuant to the *Grinnell* factors, that a class action settlement is fair,  
27 reasonable, and adequate. *See McReynolds v. Richards-Cantave*, 588 F.3d 790, 800 (2d Cir. 2009).  
28 The deference that we give the District Court's determination is "considerable": "The trial  
29 judge's views are accorded great weight because [s]he is exposed to the litigants, and their  
30 strategies, positions and proofs. Simply stated, [s]he is on the firing line and can evaluate the  
31 action accordingly." *Joel A. v. Giuliani*, 218 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation  
32 marks and alterations omitted).

1           The District Court here concluded, and Bradley does not contest on appeal, that  
2 *Grinnell* factors one, two, and eight weighed in favor of approving the settlement. As to  
3 factor one, the District Court found that the case was a complex antitrust conspiracy  
4 involving a number of parties, and that, absent settlement, Apple would attempt to draw out  
5 the litigation. As to factor two, it concluded that the class implicitly approved the  
6 settlement, observing that “[t]here have been under the circumstances few exclusions and  
7 few objections.” Tr. of Final Fairness H’rg at 12, *In Re: Elec. Books Antitrust Litig.* (No. 11-  
8 md-02293), ECF No. 686. Most importantly, as to factor eight, it found that Apple’s  
9 promised payments to consumers were reasonable in light of its assessment of their best  
10 possible recovery after trial. An expert for the private plaintiffs estimated total consumer  
11 losses resulting from the conspiracy to be approximately \$280 million. Taking into  
12 consideration the payments of approximately \$166 million that these consumers had already  
13 secured from settlements with Apple’s co-conspirators, the Settlement would give  
14 consumers just over 200 percent of their estimated losses (if the Liability Finding is  
15 affirmed), and 77 percent of their estimated losses (if the Liability Finding is either reversed  
16 and remanded, or vacated and remanded). In particular, the District Court found the former  
17 result to be “an excellent recovery” for consumers. Tr. of Final Fairness H’rg at 14; *see also*,  
18 *e.g., In re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.*, No. 03-0085, 2005 WL 3008808, at \*9 (D.N.J.  
19 Nov. 9, 2005) (concluding that payment of 56 to 69 percent of estimated damages to be  
20 “above the range of settlements routinely granted final approval,” and collecting cases).

21           Bradley argues that the District Court’s approval of the Settlement is “premature,”  
22 and that, because the Settlement’s actual payouts will depend on the outcome of the Liability  
23 Appeal, “it [was] impossible for the district court to properly analyze whether the settlement  
24 is fair.” Bradley Br. at 10. Bradley did not make this argument, however, in the District  
25 Court. It is thus waived. *See Greene v. United States*, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is a  
26 well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the  
27 first time on appeal.”).

28           Even were this argument not waived, however, we would reject it. A district court is  
29 capable of determining whether a settlement is fair and reasonable notwithstanding

1 important contingencies. Indeed, evaluation of the fairness and adequacy of *every* settlement  
2 requires a court to assess the likely outcome of future legal proceedings, namely, the relative  
3 probabilities of various outcomes if there were no settlement and the parties went to trial.  
4 *See Malchman v. Davis*, 706 F.2d 426, 433 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The trial judge determines fairness,  
5 reasonableness, and adequacy of a proposed settlement by considering[,] [*inter alia*,] the  
6 substantive terms of the settlement compared to the likely result of a trial . . . .”). As the  
7 District Court commented about *Grinnell* factor three in this case, the parties settled  
8 “essentially on the eve of trial,” after “[f]ull discovery, both fact and expert discovery, had  
9 taken place.” Tr. of Final Fairness H’rg at 12. The District Court had already issued a  
10 thorough opinion on Apple’s liability; ruled on a motion for class certification; and resolved  
11 several disputes regarding the admissibility of evidence at the damages trial. “If all discovery  
12 has been completed and the case is ready to go to trial, the court obviously has sufficient  
13 evidence to determine the adequacy of settlement.” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.*,  
14 396 F.3d 96, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

15 Also characterizing his prematurity argument as one of “ripeness,” Bradley argues  
16 that the Settlement was not yet “fit for judicial decision,” and that the District Court would  
17 have benefitted by “waiting for a decision in the [L]iability [A]ppeal.” Bradley Br. at 13–14,  
18 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ripeness, however, concerns “threshold criteria for  
19 the exercise of a federal court’s jurisdiction,” *Simmonds v. I.N.S.*, 326 F.3d 351, 356–57 (2d  
20 Cir. 2003), matters not at issue here. The dispute the District Court was charged with  
21 resolving was plainly ripe for adjudication: Apple was alleged (and found) to have  
22 orchestrated a conspiracy among publishers to raise prices of ebooks; prices rose; and  
23 consumers bought ebooks at inflated prices. *See* 791 F.3d at 298–311. Plaintiffs then filed  
24 suit, seeking to recover for harm already suffered. Evaluating a settlement of these damages  
25 claims is properly undertaken pursuant to the *Grinnell* factors—particularly, for this  
26 Settlement, factor three, which asks a court to consider “the stage of the proceedings and the  
27 amount of discovery completed”—not the ripeness doctrine. For all these reasons, the  
28 District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that factor three also supported  
29 settlement.

\* \* \*

We have considered Bradley’s remaining arguments and find them to be without any merit. The District Court observed that Bradley’s arguments were made by a “professional objector,” not by someone “who ha[s] a stake in the enterprise in a way that a class member would.” Tr. of Final Fairness H’rg at 20. In the class action settlement context, “professional objectors” are lawyers who “file stock objections to class action settlements”—objections that are “[m]ost often . . . nonmeritorious”—and then are “rewarded with a fee by class counsel to settle their objections.” William B. Rubenstein, *NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS* § 13:21 (5th ed. 2012). Bradley’s appeal, in which he asserts arguments either not presented to the District Court or devoid of merit, has done nothing to cast any doubt on the District Court’s characterization.

We **AFFIRM** the judgment of the District Court.

FOR THE COURT:  
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court